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THE POWERS OF HOME RULE CITIES
IN COLORADO*
HoWARD

C.

KLEMME**

Article XX of the Colorado constitution, which provides for
municipal home rule, was adopted in 1902 for the purpose of creating the consolidated City and County of Denver and establishing
that city's independence from state legislative control of its internal
affairs. 1 By section 6 of the original amendment, certain home rule
powers specifically conferred upon Denver were also made available
to other cities in the state. The very brevity of section 6 suggests,
however, that this objective was not then of pressing concern. 2 The
more definitive grant of home rule powers now available to cities 3
was adopted in 1912, when section 6 was amended to amplify the
*Other works on this subject include

MCBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF
498-557 (1916); McGOLDRICK, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 1916-1930, at 121-32 (1933); Johnson, Municipal HomeRule in Colorado Self-Determination v. State Supremacy, 37 DICTA 240 (1960);
McBride, Municipal Home Rule in Colorado (pts. 1-4), 31 COLO. MUNICIPALITIES
195, 216, 236 (1955), 32 COLO. MUNICIPALITIES 6 (1956) ; Reinhart, Municipal Home
Rule in Colorado, 28 MICH. L. REV. 382 (1929).
"Professor of Law, University of Colorado; A.B., Colorado, 1952; LL.B.,
Colorado, 1954; LL.M., Yale, 1960. Mr. Klemme is a former member of the Board
of Editors of ROCKY MT. L. REV.
1. People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 387, 74 Pac. 167, 172 (1903).
2. Section 6 originally read: Cities of the first and second class in this
state are hereby empowered to propose for submission to a vote of the
qualified electors, proposals for charter conventions and to hold the
same, and to amend any such charter, with the same force and in the
same manner and have the same power, as near as may be, as set out
in sections four (4) and five (5) hereof, with full power as to real and
personal property and public utilities, works or ways, as set out in section
one (1) of this amendment. COLO. CONs'r. art. XX, § 6 (1902).
With the exception of section 6 and section 8 (which simply provides that
the home rule amendment should prevail over other conflicting or inconsistent
constitutional provisions) , the remaining six sections of the amendment relate
specifically to Denver.
Section 6 was included to assure the passage of the bill which proposed the
amendment. KING, THE H(ISTORY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF DENVER WITH SPECIAL
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE

REFERENCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS

222 (1911).

3. While COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 as amended makes home rule available
to both towns and cities, it does so only if they have a population of 2,000. Since
under the present legislative classification, the dividing line between towns and
cities is also 2,000, the provisions are presently available only to cities. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 139-2-2 (Perin. Supp. 1960).
The one exception to this is the remote
possibility that an incorporated municipality had exactly 2,000 inhabitants. In
that case it would still be classed as a town under the statute but would be able
to avail itself of COLO. CONST. art. XX.
At the end of 1963, 30 Colorado municipalities had become home rule cities.
COLORADO MUNICIPAL LEAcUE, 1963 DIRECTORY, MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY OFFICIALS
IN COLORADo 30 (1963).
As listed by the League. those cities are Alamosa, Arvada,
Aurora, Boulder, Canon City, Colorado Springs, Cortez, Craig, Delta, Denver,
Durango, Edgewater, Englewood, Fort Collins, Fort Morgan, Grand Junction,
Greeley, Gunnison, Lafayette, Lamar, Littleton, Longmont, Monte Vista, Montrose,
Pueblo, Rifle, Sterling, Westminster, and Wray. Since the 1963 Directory was
issued. League officals report, Manitou Springs has also adopted home rule
status.
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powers conferred upon cities whose inhabitants might choose to avail
themselves of the constitutional provisions.
Viewed as a negative doctrine limiting state legislative interference
with local affairs of a particular municipality, or with particular
local matters of concern to all cities, home rule has been, in some
measure, accorded all municipalities by the Colorado constitution
since its orginal adoption. For example, several provisions require the
legislature, when dealing with certain local matters, to use general,
rather than local or special, laws. 4 This prevents the legislature from
acting as an ad hoc super-city council for individual cities. Other
provisions expressly prohibit legislative control of specified local matters,5 guaranteeing local self-government in these areas. None of
the provisions, however, afford the inhabitants of Colorado's municipalities any real measure of affirmative home rule; that is, the power
to decide locally how they should organize their municipal governments and what powers they should confer upon themselves as a local
governmental unit. That the primary purpose of article XX was to
achieve these objectives is nowhere better indicated than in the 1912
amendment to article XX, section 6:
It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to
the people of all municipalities coming within its provisions
the full right of self-government in both local and municipal
matters and the enumeration herein of certain powers shall
not be construed to deny such cities and towns, and to the
people thereof, any right or power essential or proper to the
full exercise of such right.
The thrust of this declaration of purpose cannot be fully appreciated without some understanding of the traditional legal rules
governing the organization and powers of municipalities. Of these
rules the most fundamental is that the legislature, when creating
municipalities and prescribing their organization and powers, is
supreme. Its powers are plenary, limited only by the constitution
4. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. XIV, § 13, requiring the use of general laws for the
organization, classification (which is limited to four classes) and designation of
powers of municipalities; art. V, § 25, prohibiting the use of local or special laws,
for "laying out, opening, altering or working roads or highways; vacating roads,
town plats, streets, alleys and public grounds; . . . creating, increasing or decreasing fees, percentage or allowances of public officers ..
"
5. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. XV, § 11, prohibiting the construction of street
railways within any municipality without the consent of local authorities; art.
XV, § 12, prohibiting any law which imposes on the people of any municipality
a new liability in respect to past transactions; art. V, § 35, prohibiting any legislative delegation "to any special commission, private corporation or association,
any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money,
property or effects . . . or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever." Had the Colorado Supreme Court not emasculated this last provision in
In re Senate Bill Providing for a Board of Public Works in the City of Denver,
12 Colo. 188, 21 Pac. 481 (1888), constitutional home rule might not have been
adopted in Colorado.
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itself.0 There are only a few cases in which courts have deviated from
this proposition by suggesting that cities may have some inherent
right of local self-government.7 The legislature's supremacy encompasses all activities, governmental and proprietary;8 no action of a
municipality is valid unless some relatively specific grant of authority
can be found in a statutory or constitutional provision.
Historically, as with private corporations, the legislature could
create a municipal corporation by enacting a special law granting a
corporate charter. By the terms of the grant, the legislature could
control the form of organization and scope of powers of any particular
city. The legislature could maintain continuing control by enacting
additional special laws amending the original corporate charter. Since
the legislature could use special laws to provide for the creation, organization and powers of municipalities, it could, if it chose, easily
assert its dominance over any city at any time.0
6. Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers
and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath
of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy.
If it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
Thus did judge Dillon state the rule as a judge. City of Clinton v. Cedar
Rapids & Mo. River R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868).
For his comments as a textwriter concerning the legislature's supremacy over organization, see DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 92 (5th ed. 1911).

Concerning municipal powers, Judge Dillon's statement in the first edition
of his treatise is undoubtedly the most widely accepted rule in the law of municipal corporations.
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses, and can exercise, the following powers, and no
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or
fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; third, those
essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation. . . . Any
reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the
courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.
DILLON, Id. at 101-02. For a more recent discussion of Dillon's rule see Tooke,
Construction and Operation of Municipal Powers, 7 TEMP. L.Q. 267 (1933).
The Colorado Supreme Court has accepted Judge Dillon's view. Phillips v.
City of Denver, 19 Colo. 179, 34 Pac. 902 (1893) ; City of Durango v. Reinsberg,
16 Colo. 327, 26 Pac. 820 (1891). See also People ex rel. Johnson v. Earl, 42 Colo.
238, 94 Pac. 294 (1908).
The basic rule continues to be applicable to non-home rule municipalities in
Colorado. Dalby v. City of Longmont, 81 Colo. 271, 256 Pac. 310 (1927). See
also City of Golden v. Ford, 141 Colo. 472, 348 P.2d 951 (1960).
7. DILLON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 98; FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW,
TEXT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS 43-45 (1949); McBain, The Doctrine of an
Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 190, 199 (1916);
Winter, Municipal Home Rule, a Progress Report?, 36 NEB. L. REV. 447, 449-50
(1957).
8. Dalby v. City of Longmont, 81 Colo. 271, 275, 256 Pac. 310, 312 (1927).
As the authority cited in note 7 supra indicates, the power of a municipality to act
either in a governmental or proprietary capacity is dependent upon legislative
grant. However, once the power has been granted and exercised, for example, by
the acquisition of property or the execution of a contract, subsequent legislative
control may be less pervasive in the case of proprietary activities than in the

case of government activities. DILLON, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 109-10. This
seems to be particularly true of municipal property held in a proprietary capacity.
2 McQUILLIAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.81 at 132 (3d ed. 1949). But see
Monaghan

v. Armatage, 218 Minn. 108, 15

N.W.2d 241,

appeal dismissed, 323

U.S. 681 (1945).
9.

RULE

See generally McBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME

1-12 (1916).
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The Colorado constitution, as originally adopted, restricted the
General Assembly to the use of general laws when providing for the
organization, classification and powers of towns and cities. 10 Had
this constitutional limitation been more complete, the home rule
movement might never have been of much importance in Colorado.
However, the constitution also provided for the preservation of the
charters of those municipalities which, prior to the constitution, had
been incorporated by local or special laws, if such municipalities
should choose to continue to operate under their special charters."
In an early case, 12 the supreme court held the General Assembly could
continue to use special laws to amend the charters of such cities.
Those specially chartered cities, therefore, which elected to continue
under their charters rendered themselves subject to the possibility of
direct legislative control.
Denver was such a city. For a time after the adoption of the
constitution the city's status actually seemed to work to its advantage,
especially in terms of the powers granted by the legislature.' 3 Gradually, however, the tables were turned. First in 1889 and then in 1891
the General Assembly, by special legislation amending the city's charter, created two boards, 14 investing them with broad powers over
important municipal affairs. To assure state control, the governor
was given power to appoint the members of each board.1 5 A
"throughly inefficient" scheme of municipal government was created
by subsequent amendments to the city's charter enacted in 1893.'1
In addition, the political turmoil of the times made impossible the
passage of special legislation designed to broaden the city's powers."7
The efforts of some of Denver's citizens to alleviate the city's problems
led eventually to the home rule movement, culminating in the adoption in 1902 of article XX.1s Thus, as seems generally true in other
states,' 9 home rule was adopted in Colorado for the purpose of re10. Art. XIV, § 13, discussed in People ex rel. Johnson v. Earl, 42 Colo. 238,
258, 94 Pac. 294, 300 (1908).
11. Art. XIV, § 14. The procedures by which a specially chartered municipality may be reorganized into one functioning under the general laws are provided
for in COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 139-8-1 to -10 (1953).
12. In re Senate Bill Providing for a Board of Public Works in the City of
Denver, 12 Colo. 188, 21 Pac. 481 (1888), citing Darrow v. People, 8 Colo. 417, 8
Pac. 661 (1885).
13. KING, op. cit. supra note 2, at 108, 110.
14. The Board of Public Works and the Fire and Police Board. The constitutional validity of the former was decided by the court in In re Senate Bill Providing for a Board of Public Works in the City of Denver, 12 Colo. 188, 21 Pac.
481 (1888).
15. KING, op. cit. supra note 2, at 124-30.
16. Id. at 192.
17. Id. at 218.
18. Id. at 211-22. Another interesting history of the home rule amendment is
provided by the Author of the amendment himself in RUSH, THE CITY-COUNTY
CONSOLIDATED 327-54 (1941).

19. McBAIN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 5-9, 110-12: Tollemaar, A Home Rule
Puzzle, 50 NAT'. Civic REV. 411 (1961).
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lieving municipalities from their dependence on legislative action for
their form of organization and powers and from the resultant inter20
ference in municipal affairs such dependence made possible.
SUBSTANTIVE

POWERS IN GENERAL

The most famous case defining the scope of the substantive
powers conferred upon municipalities by the home rule amendment
is City & County of Denver v. Hallett.2 1 "[Article XX] was intended
to confer not only the powers specially mentioned, but to bestow
upon the people of Denver [as a home rule city] every power pos22
sessed by the Legislature in the making of a charter for Denver."
Under this broad standard, the test for determining the validity of
action taken by a city is simply whether or not the legislature could
have authorized the action taken. 23 This standard has been reaf24
firmed by the court on many occasions.
Competing with this standard is a second: "The purpose of
article XX was to give to the people of the city and county of
Denver [as a home rule city] exclusive control in matters of local
concern only." 25 Needless to say, this standard, too, has often been
reaffirmed by the court.
These represent the two extremes the court has reached in attempting to establish guide lines for municipal activity under the home
rule amendment. Which standard the court uses tends to depend
upon two factors: (1) what power the city is attempting to exercise,
e.g., the police power or the taxing power; and (2) whether or
not the city's exercise of its legislative power is in apparent conflict with the state's exercise of its legislative power.
Neither standard is very useful in trying to decide whether a
home rule city has authority to engage in a given activity. One
reason is that the two standards are not coextensive. Some matters
are sufficiently local to justify the conclusion that the legislature
20.

Even if the constitution had not preserved the charters of those cities which

had been specially incorporated prior to the adoption of the constitution, the legislature might still have been able to exert extensive control over the City of Denver,
thereby providing the impetus for the home rule amendment. COLO. CONST. art.
XIV, § 13 requires the legislature to use general laws in providing for the incorporation and powers of municipalities. The section also permits the legislature
to classify municipalities into as many as four classes. To the extent Denver had
a larger population than other cities, the
legislature could have so classified
cities that only Denver would fall within a given class. Thereafter, though the
laws regulating that particular class would have been general in form, they
would in fact have been special in the sense that they would have been applicable
only to Denver.
21. 34 Colo. 393, 83 Pac. 1066 (1905).

22. Id. at 399, 83 Pac. at 1068.
23. City & County of Denver v. Board of County Comm'rs, 113 Colo. 150, 156
P.2d 101 (1945).
24. See, e.g., Fishel v. City & County of Denver, 106 Colo. 576, 108 P.2d 236
(1940) ; City & County of Denver v. Henry, 95 Colo. 582, 38 P.2d 895 (1934); Newtorf
v. City of Fort Collins, 78 Colo. 380, 241 Pac. 1114 (1925).
25. Mauff v. People, 52 Colo. 562, 568, 123 Pac. 101, 103 (1912). See also Willianis v. People, 38 Colo. 497, 88 Pac. 463 (1906).
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could authorize a city to regulate or control them, and hence under
the Hallett rule a home rule city would have power to do so. On
the other hand, these same matters may not be "local only" and
consequently under the second standard they would be beyond the
purview of a home rule city. On occasion the court has attempted
to bring the two standards together. In one case the court asserted
that any power the legislature could have delegated before the amend26
ment rendered the matter one of local or municipal concern.
While In another it indicated that the propriety of any delegation
by the general assembly of powers to a municipality depended on
27
the subject matter being of purely local concern.
The home rule amendment does not exempt cities operating
under it from the basic rule applicable to legislative cities28 that
action taken by a city without authority is invalid. 29 There are two
important differences, however, which must be kept in mind when
applying this rule to a home rule city. First, in claiming authority
30
to justify its action, a legislative city is limited to the state statutes
and a few constitutional provisions.3' A home rule city, on the other
hand, may appeal for its authority to the home rule amendment,
to its charter and in many, if not most, instances, to the general statutes
applicable to the class of cities in which the city falls.
The second difference relates to how specific the grant of authority must be before the city may validly exercise any particular power.
Under the traditional rules3 2 a legislative city, in order to sustain

the exercise of a substantive power, must be able to demonstrate a
more or less specific statutory grant of authority from the legislature.
A home rule city is not limited to its charter in the same way. A
power may be exercised by the city council of a home rule city even
though the charter does not expressly, or by necessary implication,
grant it.13 The power must not, of course, be limited either by the
26. City of Pueblo v. Kurtz, 66 Colo. 447, 182 Pac. 884 (1919).
27. Sanborn v. City of Boulder, 74 Colo. 358, 221 Pac. 1077 (1923).
28. A city incorporated under general laws is here called a "statutory" or
"legislative" city.
29. "If a municipality acts beyond the authority granted it by the legislative
enabling act or constitutional home rule provision or charter adopted thereunder,
the action is ultra vires and therefore invalid whether or not it conflicts with a
state statute." Comment, 72 HARV. L. Rrv. 737, 739 (1959).
30. See note 7 supra.
31. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1, which provides that "municipalities
may provide for the manner of exercising the initiative and referendum powers
as to their municipal legislation."
32. See discussion note 7 supra.
33. "[A]s a general rule the powers vested in home-rule cities, not specifically
limited, by constitution or charter, may be exercised through their legislative
authority." People ex rel. McQuaid v. Pickens, 91 Colo. 109, 112, 12 P.2d 349,
351 (1932), citing Newton v. City of Fort Collins, 78 Colo. 380, 241 Pac. 1114 (1925).
The holding of the McQuaid case supra was subsequently approved and a pplied in
Fishel v. City & County of Denver, 106 Colo. 576, 585, 108 P.2d 236, 241 (1940).
It may not be without significance that at the time the Fishel case was decided
a provision in the charter generally conferred on the city council all legislative
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charter or by the constitution, and it must be one which is at least
generally conferred by the home rule amendment, that is, one relating
to a local or municipal matter. Within the scope of these broad
powers, however, the charter is an instrument of limitation, not one
of grant. 3 4 For example, in order that the city council of a legislative city may enact a valid ordinance providing for the construction
of a municipal auditorium, there must be a statute authorizing the
activity. However, for the city council of a home rule city to enact
such an ordinance, a charter provision specifically conferring such
authority is not required. Reference to the charter is necessary only
to determine the existence of any limitations. Failure to comply with
35
any limitations will render the action invalid.
In addition to the charter-making powers of section 4 and the
charter-amending powers of section 5 conferred on all home rule
cities by section 6 of article XX, section 6 itself enumerates several
specific powers.3 6 It also adopts by reference the enumerated powers
powers possessed by the city except as otherwise provided for. See also Laverty v.
Straub, 110 Colo. 311, 134 P.2d 208 (1943); Clough v. City of Colorado Springs,
70 Colo. 87, 197 Pac. 896 (1921).
34. The recent case of Fellows v. LaTronica, 377 P.2d 547 (Colo. 1962), tends
to limit the usefulness of the general rule of the McQuaid case, supra note 33, by
suggesting that an implied limitation in a city's home rule charter may not be too
difficult to find. See also City & County of Denver v. Denver Buick, 141 Colo.
121, 347 P.2d 919 (1960).
35. See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. Miller, 149 Colo. 96, 368 P.2d 982
(1962) ; McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 123 Colo. 132, 230 P.2d 591 (1950).
36. From and after the certifying to and filing with the secretary of
state of a charter framed and approved in reasonable conformity with
the provisions of this article, such city or town, and the citizens thereof,
shall have the powers set out in sections 1, 4 and 5 of this article, and
all other powers necessary, requisite or proper for the government and
administration of its local and municipal matters, including power to
legislate upon, provide, regulate, conduct and control:
a. The creation and terms of municipal officers, agencies and employments; the definition, regulation and alteration of the powers, duties,
qualifications and terms or tenure of all municipal officers, agents and
employees;
b. The creation of police courts; the definition and regulation of the
jurisdiction, powers and duties thereof, and the election or appointment
of police magistrates therefor;
c. The creation of municipal courts; the definition and regulation
of the jurisdiction, powers and duties thereof, and the election or appointment of the officers thereof;
d. All matters pertaining to municipal elections in such city or town,
and to electoral votes therein on measures submitted under the charter or
ordinances thereof, including the calling or notice and the date of such
election or vote, the registration of voters, nominations, nomination and
election systems, judges and clerks of election, the form of ballots, balloting,
challenging, canvassing, certifying the result, securing the purity of
elections, guarding against abuses of the elective franchise, and tending to
make such elections or electoral votes non-partisan in character;
e. The issuance, refunding and liquidation of all kinds of municipal
obligations, including bonds and other obligations of park, water and
local improvement districts;
f. The consolidation and management of park or water districts in
such cities or towns or within the jurisdiction thereof; but no such consolidation shall be effective until approved by the vote of a majority,
in each district to be consolidated, of the qualified electors voting therein
upon the question;
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of section 1.37 The enumerated powers in section 6 are supplemented
by a general grant of "all other powers necessary, requisite or proper
for the government and administration of [the city's] local and municipal matters."
As set out in section 6, the basic law of municipal home rule
can be easily stated. 1 a matter is of local or municipal concern, a
home rule city may regulate or otherwise control or act with reference
to it. In the absence of municipal action the matter is to be governed
by applicable state law. If the matter is solely of local or municipal
concern and the city has acted with reference to it, the municipality's
action will supersede any conflicting state statute regulating the same
matter. If a matter is solely of statewide, as opposed to local or
municipal concern, no action taken by the municipality with reference
to it is valid. A municipality can claim no authority to regulate such
matters under the home rule amendment.a8
Although the basic law may be simply stated, the problems it

presents have not been so simple to resolve.

What, for example,

constitutes a local or municipal matter as opposed to a statewide
matter? Are the categories of "local" and "statewide" mutually exg. The assessment of property in such city or town for municipal
taxation and the levy and collection of taxes thereon for municipal purposes and special assessments for local improvements; such assessments,
evy and collection of taxes and special assessments to be made by municipal officials or by the county or state officials as may be provided by
the charter;
h. The imposition, enforcement and collection of fines and penalties
for the violation of any of the provisions of the charter, or of any ordinance adopted in pursuance of the charter ....
CoLo. CoNsT. art. XX,

§ 6.

37. By virtue of this adoption, home rule cities are given perpetual succession and:
may sue and defend, plead and be impleaded, in all courts and places,
and in all matters and proceedings; may have and use a common seal
and alter the same at pleasure; may purchase, receive, hold and enjoy,
or sell and dispose of, real and personal property; may receive bequests,
gifts, and donations of all kinds of property, in fee simple, or in trust
for public, charitable or other purposes; and do all things and acts
necessary to carry out the purposes of such gifts, bequests and donations,
with power to manage, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the same in
accordance with the terms of the gift, bequest or trust; shall have the
power, within or without its territorial limits, to construct, condemn
and purchase, purchase, acquire, lease, add to, maintain, conduct and
operate, water works, light plants, power plants, transportation systems,
heating plants, and any other public utilities or works or ways local in
use and extent, in whole or in part, and everything required therefor,
for the use of said city . . . and the inhabitants thereof, and any such
systems, plants or works or ways, or any contracts in relation or connection
with either, that may exist and which said city ... may desire to purchase,
in whole or in part, the same or any part thereof may be purchased
by said city . . . which may enforce such purchase by proceedings at
law as in taking land for public use by right of eminent domain, and
shall have the power to issue bonds upon the vote of the taxpaying
electors, at any special or general election, in any amount necessary to
carry out any of said powers or purposes, as may by the charter be
provided. CoLo. CONST. art. XX, § 1.
38. City & County of Denver v. Palmer, 140 Colo. 27, 342 P.2d 687 (1959);
Glendinning v. City & County of Denver, 50 Colo. 240, 114 Pac. 652 (1911).
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clusive, or are there some matters which fairly can be said to partake
of both? If there are such "mixed" matters, may a home rule city
regulate them? If so, under what conditions? Finally, in the absence
of municipal action with reference to a local matter, under what
conditions, if any, may the state, through its general laws, regulate the
matters?
CHARACTERIZATION

OF SUBJECTS AS LOCAL OR STATEWIDE

Since the categorization of subjects under the home rule amendment as statewide or local determines the allocation of basic legislative
powers as between the General Assembly and home rule cities, it
should not be surprising that the court has had difficulty making
these characterizations. In the first place, the task of allocating legislative powers often involves fundamental policy questions, which,
being essentially political, are not the type courts are particularly well
suited to resolve. 39 Secondly, the categories are not susceptible to
any precise definition, primarily because few, if any, subjects can be
said to be entirely local or entirely statewide. 40 Finally, as the court
itself has recognized, once a matter has been classified, its classification
is subject to change in the light of altered conditions and circum41
stances.
Nothing illustrates better the impossibility of giving any precise
definition to "local" or "statewide" than the fact that the court
has never tried to do so. The court has yet to develop any useful
test for distinguishing the two, although it has indicated from time
to time some factors which may influence it in making any particular
decision. For example, in one case the fact that the subject matter
which the municipal regulation was attempting to control was peculiar
to heavily populated areas caused the court to view the matter as
local. 42

On the other hand, the subject matter in another case was

classed as one of statewide concern because the municipal regulation would have a substantial impact on persons living outside the
city. 43
If uniformity of regulation seems desirable, the matter is
likely to be classed as statewide. 44 Whether uniformity is desirable
39. McBAIN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 669-73, 684; Mendelson, Paths to Constitutional Home Rule for Municipalities, 6 VAND. L. REV. 66, 76-77 (1952).
40. "It has been a fundamental difficulty with the home rule concept from
the beginning that public affairs are not inherently either local or general in
nature." Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9
OHIO ST. L.J. 18, 25 (1948); See also Mendelson, supra note 39, at 69-70.
41. People v. Graham, 107 Colo. 202, 205, 110 P.2d 256, 257 (1941); People
ex rel. Stokes v. Newton, 106 Colo. 61, 66, 101 P.2d 21, 23 (1940). See also Walker,
Toward a New Theory of Municipal Home Rule, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 571, 582
(1955).
42. Dominguez v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 233, 363 P.2d 661
(1961) (vagrancy).
43. People ex rel. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 125
Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952), overruling City & County of Denver v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 67 Colo. 225, 184 Pac. 604 (1919) (regulation of telephone
rates).
44. People v. Graham, 107 Colo. 202, 110 P.2d 256 (1941) (duties to stop
after a traffic accident, give name and address and render aid).
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may depend on whether local physical conditions vary sufficiently to
45
justify variations in local regulations.
In a very brief opinion the court recently held larceny to be a
matter of statewide concern and invalidated a municipal ordinance
which sought to regulate the subject. 46 Only Justice Doyle in a concurring opinion4 7 offered an explanation for the conclusion. In
deciding how a specific subject should be classified, he suggested the
respective interests of the state and the municipality should be
weighed, and if those of the municipality greatly outweigh those of
the state, the municipality's regulation should prevail by classifying
the subject as local. If, on the other hand, the interests of the state
greatly outweigh those of the municipality, the matter should be
classed as statewide, with the state retaining sole legislative jurisdiction. Aside from the fact that the city was attempting to regulate
conduct which historically had been controlled by the state, Justice
Doyle also noted 48 that the specific problem dealt with by the ordinance was a "general one faced by all citizens and communities" in the
state. The specific problem was not peculiar to cities of "metropolis
size." It was his conclusion, because of the seriousness of the conduct,
that the state's interest in obtaining clarity and uniformity of definition, "a high level of enforcement, a parity in sentencing procedures
and effective reformatory practices" 4 9 had to prevail by classifying
the subject as exclusively statewide.
In some cases where the legislature has enacted a statute
regulating a matter and a municipality has attempted to do the
same by ordinance, the court has tended to raise a presumption
in favor of the state that the matter is of statewide concern.
This has occurred even though the policy sought to be effectuated by the ordinance was consistent with the policy the statute was
intended to further. ' The court has wisely rejected the proposition
that regulation by the legislature automatically renders the matter
of statewide concern. To hold otherwise would "strip all of the home
rule cities . . . of every last vestige of local rule and local control

with the possible exception of a few regulatory and licensing ordinances.''
The fact remains that a party seeking to rely on the city's
right to control will usually have a more difficult task persuading
the court than a party who is asserting the state's right to control.
45.

Retallack v. Police Court, 142 Colo. 214, 351 P.2d 884 (1960) (reckless

46.
47.

Gazotti v. City & County of Denver, 143 Colo. 311, 352 P.2d 963 (1960).
Id. at 315, 352 P.2d at 965.

driving held local) ; City & County of Denver v. Henry, 95 Colo. 582, 38 P.2d 895
(1934) (duty to yield right-of-way at street intersections held local).

48. Id. at 317-18, 352 P.2d at 966-67.
49. Id. at 318, 352 P.2d at 967.
50. See, e.g., City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958);
Mauff v. People, 52 Colo. 562, 123 Pac. 101 (1912). The specific holding of the
Mauff case was subsequently nullified by an express provision in the 1912 amendment to Section 6. See subsection d, note 36 supra.
51. Retallack v. Police Court, 142 Colo. 214, 216, 351 P.2d 884, 885 (1960).
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This situation of concurrent, and hence potentially conflicting,
legislative regulation occurs most frequently when both the city and
the state are exercising the police power for the protection of public
health or safety. The two cases which best illustrate the presumption
in favor of state control, however, involved other municipal powers;
specifically the power to spend municipal funds and the power to
levy special assessments. In Keefe v. People,5 2 the court upheld the
criminal conviction of a contractor who had not complied with a
state statute imposing maximum hours of work for laborers employed on projects undertaken in behalf of any municipality. The
court acknowledged that under the then existing state of constitutional
law the statute could not be upheld under the state's police power. It
could, however, be sustained under the state's right to control the
terms and conditions under which work for itself and its political
subdivisions could be done. The fact that the work was being done
for a home rule city was not considered relevant, although one
would have expected that under the home rule amendment the city
and not the state had the right to control the terms and conditions
under which work was done for the city.
The court seemed to adopt the view that state legislation on the
subject automatically rendered it one of statewide concern and thereby deprived the home rule city of any control over it.
[Denver as a home rule city] is just as much an agency
of the state for the purpose of government as if it was organized under a general law passed by the general assembly.
... It is as much amenable to state control in all matters of
a public, as distinguished from matters of a local, character,
as are other municipalities. The state still has the supreme
power to enact general laws declaring what shall be its
public policy, and it can make them applicable to the city
of Denver. .

.

. What the public policy of the state is, rests

with its legislative department."a
While the city had not attempted to regulate the subject matter
involved in the Keefe case by ordinance, the court's holding indicates
that had it attempted to do so, the ordinance would have been invalid.
While the Keefe case was decided prior to the 1912 amendment
expanding section 6, the court followed the same approach after the
52.

37 Colo. 317, 87 Pac. 791 (1906).

53. Id. at 324-25, 87 Pac. at 793. The court continued:
The work of building a sanitary sewer by a city, in a sense, is local, in
that it affects, primarily, its own citizens; but it is directly connected
with the public health, and is a matter of concern and great importance
to the people of the entire state.
The subject matter which was either of local or statewide concern was, of
course, not the sewer, but the maximum hours an employee could be permitted
to work for a contractor doing work for the city. The state, as the court notes,
could not as the law then stood impose such a restriction under the police
power. This being the case, the effect such a requirement would have on the
cost to the city of having the work done would seem to render the subject wholly
a matter of local concern.
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1912 amendment in City & County of Denver v. Tihen.54 In that case
the court held a home rule city was bound by a state statute exempting
the property of non-profit cemetery corporations from local assessments. As one of its premises, the court again accepted the argument
that:
The Legislature of a state has sole power to say what the
public policy of the state shall be [and that] public policy
must be applicable to all portions of the state. . . .The
people of the state, in adopting article XX and the amendments thereto, did not intend to confer upon municipalities
organized thereunder the absolute and unrestricted power
to tax, or to make assessments for local improvements regardless of public policy. 5 5
No argument could misconceive the purposes of the home rule
amendment more completely. No one would expect a public power
to be exercised without regard to public policy. The question is:
public policy as determined by whom? The home rule amendment
makes clear that a public policy concerning a local matter can be
determined by the state, but only so long as it does not conflict with
a contrary determination made by a home rule city. In terms of
the power to formulate a public policy about a local matter, the home
rule amendment must be construed as divesting the legislature of
its "sole" power to declare the public policy, for if it does not, the
amendment and most of its language makes no sense at all.
The fundamental legislative question in the case was: who
should pay the cost of improvements benefiting abutting land owned
by a non-profit cemetery corporation-the taxpayers of the city or
those who would receive the benefit of the improvements through
their purchases of land from the corporation? If the answer to such
a question is not a purely local matter, it is difficult to conceive of
any policy determination which could properly be considered local.
The fact that cemeteries were exempted from local assessments
before article XX was adopted hardly justifies the conclusion that
home rule cities were not given a power to adopt a contrary policy.
If this were not true, home rule cities would be bound by every
statute regulating towns and cities enacted prior to article XX. As
far as local matters are concerned, however, the fundamental objective of article XX was to permit cities, if they should so choose, to
free themselves from the operation of just such statutes.
Neither does the "general sentiment of all civilized people",""
that burial grounds are sacred justify the conclusion that the liability
of non-profit cemetery corporations for special assessments is a mat54. 77 Colo. 212, 235 Pac. 777 (1925).
55. Id. at 219, 235 Pac. at 780.
56. Id. at 223, 235 Pac. at 782.
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ter of statewide concern. To say that a subject about which there
is a general public sentiment is a matter of statewide concern is inconsistent with the home rule amendment, since almost every statute
can be taken as expressing a public sentiment and the existence of
any statute on any subject would thereby render the subject one of
57
statewide concern. This view the court has specifically rejected.
It hardly need be said that the existence or non-existence of a general
public sentiment about. a subject was not the criterion upon which
the drafters of article XX expected the court to determine the legislative jurisdiction of hone rule cities. In the absence of a specific
constitutional provision, the public policy of exempting or not exempting non-profit cemetery corporations from special assessments
would clearly seem to be a matter for local determination, especially
in view of the express provisions of article XX. 5s
While it may have been unfortunate that the court in Keefe and
Tihen took such a limited view of the home rule amendment, it may
not be so unfortunate that the court generally tends to favor the state
over home rule cities in instances of conflict. As one author has noted:
For those upon whom such responsibility falls must be constantly aware that there is far greater danger in depriving a
larger, rather than a smaller, unit of government of any
power. Thus at the very least in cases of doubt . . . the
judicial tendency must be-and quite properly is-against
home rule.5 9
THE POWER OF A HOME RULE CITY TO REGULATE MATTERS

INVOLVING STATEWIDE INTERESTS

A careful reading of section 6 reveals that in no place does the
provision speak of a category other than local and municipal. The
category "statewide" has been created by the courts on the basis of
obvious implication. The question is: Is this the only other category
which can be fairly implied from section 6?
Several earlier cases recognized that there are subject matters
which involve both local and state interests and these subjects cannot,
therefore, be classified exclusively as either local or statewide. The
licensing of hospitals for the protection of the public health,60 the
regulation of pawnbrokers" t and peddlers,6 2 and the establishment
of pension funds for firemen and policemen 0 have thus been treated
as matters of "mixed" concern.
57. Retallick v. Police Court, 142 Colo. 214, 216, 351 P.2d 884, 885 (1960).
58. See COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (g) note 36 supra.
59. Mendelson, supra note 39 at 70.
60. Spears Hosp. v. State Bd. of Health, 122 Colo. 147, 220 P.2d 872 (1950).
61. Provident Loan Soc'y v. City & County of Denver, 64 Colo. 400, 172 Pac.
10 (1918).
62. McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P.2d 969 (1940).
63. Board of Trustees v. People ex rel. Behrman, 119 Colo. 301, 203 P.2d
490 (1949), overruled on other grounds, Police Pension v. McPhail, 139 Colo. 330,
338 P.2d 694 (1959).
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In these areas of mixed concern a home rule city could, according to these earlier cases, properly regulate the subject matter on the
basis of the home rule amendment.6 4 The fact that the legislature
too had chosen to regulate did not deprive the home rule city of
its power to regulate the same subject matter unless the municipal
regulation conflicted with that of the state, 65 or unless the state by
its legislative exercise of power intended to occupy the field. 66
In these earlier cases the court did not treat the dual exercise by
a home rule city and by the General Assembly of their respective
legislative jurisdictions over the same subject matter as necessarily
creating a conflict. More typically the court viewed the municipal
regulation as properly supplementing the state statute when, although
more stringent, the municipal regulation was in accord with the
basic policy of the statute. 1 The added problems which might arise
because of the greater density of population in cities was taken by
the court as sufficient justification for the imposition of more rigid
restrictions by the municipality. 68 The test for determining whether
a statute and an ordinance conflicted was whether the ordinance permitted that which the statute prohibited or vice versa. 69 In cases
involving conflicts of this sort, the statute prevailed and the ordinance
was held invalid3 0 And even though there was no such conflict, an
ordinance regulating a mixed matter did not supersede the statute.
The statute continued to be applicable to persons in home rule
7
cities. 1
To some extent the use of this category of mixed matters permitted the court to lighten its burden of allocating legislative powers
64. "Whether there shall or shall not be soliciting in or upon private
residences within the city, at least until the state has seen fit to exercise its police
powers with reference to it, is a matter of local concern only." McCormick v.
City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 501, 99 P.2d 969, 972-73 (1940).
65. Provident Loan Soc'y v. City & County of Denver, 64 Colo. 400, 172 Pac.
10 (1918); Ray v. City & County of Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942)
(by implication).
66. Board of Trustees v. People ex rel. Behrman, 119 Colo. 301, 203 P.2d 490
(1949), overruled on other grounds, Police Pension v. McPhail, 139 Colo. 330, 338
P.2d 694 (1959).
67. It is well settled that the mere fact that the state, in the exercise of
the police power, has made certain regulations does not, however, prohibit
a municipality from exacting additional requirements. So long as there
is no conflict between the two . . . both will stand. . . . The city has
the power to legislate upon local and municipal matters. If, as contended
by plaintiff in error, the [matter] is . . . of state-wide interest, this fact
does not prevent [the matter] from being also a matter of municipal
interest. The preservation of the health, safety, welfare and comfort of
the dwellers in urban centers of population requires the enforcement of
very different and ususally much more stringent police regulations in
such districts than are necessary in a state taken as a whole.
Provident Loan Soc'y v. City & County of Denver, 64 Colo. 400, 404-05, 172
Pac. 10, 12 (1918).
68. Id. See also Spears Hosp. v. State Bd. of Health, 122 Colo. 147, 149-50,
220 P.2d 872, 874 (1950) (dictum).
69. Ray v. City & County of Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942).
70. Ibid.
71. Spears Hosp. v. State Bd. of Health, 122 Colo. 147, 220 P.2d 872 (1950).
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under the home rule amendment between the General Assembly
and home rule cities. Nonetheless, for a brief period, the court abandoned the device in favor of the doctrine of mutual exclusion. This
72
doctrine was first enunciated as dictum in the Merris case.
In the company of words, appearing in Article XX,
Section 6, the term "supersede" means that the law of the
state is displaced on a local and municipal matter where
there is an ordinance put in its place. Where, however, the
matter is of statewide concern, supersession does not take
place. Application of state law or municipal
ordinance,
3
whichever pertains, is mutually exclusive7
Under this doctrine, the respective legislative jurisdictions of
the state and the home rule city are encompassed within two distinct,
separate spheres. If a matter involves a statewide interest, the legislature's jurisdiction is exclusive and a home rule city has no power
whatever to regulate the matter. If the matter is "purely" or "strictly"
a local matter, then the home rule city has exclusive legislative jurisdiction and the state may not regulate it.74
Although it was originally presented as dictum in Merris, the
doctrine of mutual exclusion was soon transformed into a holding.
In In re Senate Bill No. 72, 75 the court was asked by the Governor
for an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of a statute which
in effect sought to re-establish the law as it existed prior to the creation of the doctrine of mutual exclusion. The statute provided generally that municipal corporations should have the power to make
and publish ordinances which were not inconsistent with state law,
for the purpose of carrying into effect and discharging the various
powers and duties conferred by the state statutes or which were
deemed necessary to provide for the safety, health and welfare of the
corporation and its inhabitants. Although the statute did not mention home rule cities specifically, the language of the statute, at
least in part, seemed clearly intended to apply to them.
It shall be the public policy of the state that where the
subject matter of a municipal ordinance may be of both local
and municipal concern and also of state wide concern, the
existence of state legislation upon such subject matter, or the
72. City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
73. Id. at 180, 323 P.2d at 620. The court cited no authority in support of
the doctrine. Had it desired to do so, however, it could have relied on language
from earlier cases asserting that the powers conferred upon home rule cities
by the amendment are limited to matters "purely" of local concern. See, e.g.,
Williams v. People, 38 Colo. 497, 506, 88 Pac. 463, 466 (1906). "[The charter
of a home rule city] is confined to . . . local concerns, and cannot invade the
field of county or state legislation at all, and, as to such matters, the general
assembly is both supreme and exclusive except as limited by the constitution."
74. City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958), as

interpreted in Woolverton v. City & County of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 251-52, 361
P.2d 982, 984 (1961).
75. 139 Colo. 371, 339 P.2d 501 (1959).
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subsequent adoption of state legislation thereon, shall not
deprive any municipal corporation of the right or power to
make ...

ordinances thereon not inconsistent with the laws

of the state, nor be construed to mean that such subject matter is solely of statewide concern, unless it is expressly declared by statute that only the state shall have power to
adopt legislation thereon .... 76
It is evident from this and other provisions in the statute that
the statute was the legislature's answer to some of the problems created
77
or suggested by the Merris decision.
Without discussion, the court advised the Governor that the
statute was unconstitutional for at least two reasons. First, the
statute unconstitutionally delegated legislative power over matters
of statewide concern to municipal corporations, and secondly, the
statute unconstitutionally authorized the adoption of special and
local laws in violation of article V, section 25. In view of the effect
this decision had on the prior cases involving mixed matters, where
the court had permitted simultaneous regulation by the state and
home rule cities, an explanation of the court's holding would, to say
the least, have been useful.
Almost immediately after the decision in In re Senate Bill No. 72
was rendered, however, the court began to depart from the holding
by rejecting the premise on which it was based-the doctrine of mutual
exclusion as espoused in the Merris case. Insofar as the court's holding in the case could be said to be applicable to its own prior decisions
involving the power of home rule cities to regulate mixed matters, the
case, as we shall see, has been overruled sub silentio.
In Davis v. City & County of Denver,78 the defendant had been
convicted of violating a municipal ordinance prohibiting a person
from driving while his license was suspended. The court held the
ordinance invalid on the grounds that the state statute which regulated
the same conduct was intended by the legislature to pre-empt the
field. The court also noted in dictum, however, that nothing in the
Constitution required that as to all matters of general interest the
state alone be deemed to have exclusive legislative jurisdiction. Al.
though the matter may be of predominantly statewide concern, a municipality may have a sufficient interest to justify a delegation of power
to it to regulate the matter.
76. As quoted by the court. Id. at 373, 339 P.2d at 502.
77. The statute, for example, provided that where a municipal ordinance
and a state criminal statute punished the same conduct, prosecution for violation
of the ordinance would bar prosecution for violation of the statute and vice
versa. The statute also preserved that part of the Merris case which required
that prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances be tried in accord with
criminal rather than civil procedures.
78. 140 Colo. 30, 342 P.2d 674 (1959).
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The power to so delegate is, of course, subject to the limitation that the State cannot surrender its sovereignty with respect to subjects exclusively statewide and general. However,
the authority of the State to delegate police powers to the
municipality in those areas where the subject matter, although predominately general is also to some extent municipal, seems to be approved practice.7 9
The court rejected the mutual exclusion doctrine of Merris:
To hold that matters which are general are the exclusive preserve of the state, just as matters local and municipal can be
regulated only by the city (once the city has acted) would
create a highly inflexible system and would require the state
or city to obtain a continuous stream of rulings from this
Court as to whether a subject is local or state-wide. This
kind of 'strait jacket' rule is inappropriate to the changing
society in which we live and Canon City v. Merris . . .
should not be construed as so holding8s
The power of a home rule city to regulate these mixed matters,
said the court, can only be exercised if the state consents to its exercise. Since there was no statute delegating the power to, or consenting to its exercise by, the city in this particular case, the ordinance was held invalid.
Justice Frantz, who had written the opinions for the majority in
both the Merris and In re Senate Bill No. 72 cases, concurred 8 l on
the grounds that the matter was of statewide concern and, therefore,
was subject to the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the state. Consistent with his opinion in the latter case, Justice Frantz viewed as
unconstitutional any legislative delegation of powers to cities to
regulate matters involving any degree of statewide concern.
In another case s 2 decided the same day as Davis, with Justice
Doyle writing the opinion for the majority, the court considered again
the limits of a home rule city's powers to regulate matters of joint
concern to the state and a municipality. The case involved the
question of Denver's authority to regulate speeds on that section of
the Valley Highway located within the city. By an agreement between the city and the State Highway Engineer, the city agreed not
to establish a speed limit of less than 50 m.p.h. without the written
consent of the State Engineer. Parking regulations were not to be
put into effect by the city without prior approval by the State Engineer. The duties of maintaining, policing and lighting the highway were placed on the city. A statute authorized the State Engineer
to enter into such agreements; an ordinance authorized the mayor
of Denver to enter into this particular agreement. The trial court
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 38, 342 P.2d at 677.
Id. at 40, 342 P.2d at 679.
Id. at 42, 342 P.2d at 680.
City &County of Denver v. Pike, 140 Colo. 17, 342 P.2d 688 (1959).
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had held the city lacked jurisdiction to put these speed limits into
effect, despite the agreement, because they had not been submitted to
the State Department of Highways for approval as required by another
statute. The city claimed that the regulation of speeds on a state
highway within a home rule city was a matter of local concern and
subject to the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of a home rule city
if it choose to exercise such jurisdiction. The city, therefore, asserted
its ordinance would have been valid even had there been no agreement between itself and the State Engineer.
The supreme court, on appeal, rejected the city's contention that
the agreement and the statute authorizing the agreement were irrelevant considerations. Regulation of speed on a state highway is
a matter of mixed concern. Because the highway is a connecting
link across the city between other state highways, the state has an
interest in preventing local regulations which might interfere with
statewide or national travel. On the other hand, as the highway
serves as a city street carrying heavy intra-city traffic, the city has an
obvious interest in controlling traffic flow. The city's regulation was,
therefore, valid, the state having consented to it through its State
Engineer. Formal consent from the Highway Department as required
by the second statute was unnecessary.
Again, Justice Frantz, relying on the doctrine of mutual exclusion concurred8 3 in the result on the grounds that the matter was
one of local concern, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the city
if it chose to exercise it.
The doctrine of mutual exclusion as originally set forth in the
Merris case was finally, by specific holding, rejected by the court in
Woolverton v. City & County of Denver.84 With some care, Justice
Doyle, again writing for the majority, reviewed the earlier cases, 85
coming to the conclusion that the doctrine was contrary to the basic
law the court had been developing under the home rule amendment
for several decades. The home rule amendment must be read, Justice
Doyle continued, as contemplating at least three broad categories into
which subjects may be classified-those which are wholly local; those
which are strictly statewide; and those which, though predominantly
statewide, are of sufficient concern to municipalities to permit supplemental regulations 6 The doctrine of mutual exclusion, if there
is any room for it in the law of home rule, "has validity [only] as
83. Id. at 26, 342 P.2d at 693.
84. 146 Colo. 247, 361 P.2d 982 (1961).

85. E.g., Spears Hosp. v. State Bd. of Health, 122 Colo. 147, 220 P.2d 872
(1950) ; McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P.2d 969 (1939) ; Provident Loan Soc'y v. City & County of Denver, 64 Colo. 400, 172 Pac. 10 (1918).
86. A fourth category for matters which are predominately local but which
involve some statewide interests is also possible.
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between the home rule city and the state where the subject is unques87
tionably and wholly local or is strictly statewide."
This statement, it will be noted, is not completely accurate, for
even in these areas, the exclusion is not mutual. A home rule city
does not have exclusive legislative jurisdiction over local matters unless it chooses to exercise such jurisdiction. Until then, a state statute
governing a local matter is, by the express language of section 6, the
applicable law.88 Supersession does not occur until the home rule
city acts by adopting a conflicting provision. As to matters which
are strictly statewide, only the state has jurisdiction and the legislature may not delegate to a home rule city the power to regulate such
subject matters. The state's jurisdiction over strictly statewide matters therefore is exclusive, but a home rule city's jurisdiction over
strictly local matters is not, unless the city should decide to make it
so by enacting a conflicting ordinance or adopting a conflicting charter
provision.
As to matters which are predominantly statewide, but which are
also of local interest, both the home rule city and the legislature may
regulate the matter. As a home rule city can assume exclusive jurisdiction over a strictly local matter by enacting a conflicting ordinance, the state legislature can assume exclusive jurisdiction over
"mixed" matters by pre-empting the field, or, as the court has sometimes put it, by refusing to consent to the regulation by the home
rule city.
The Woolverton case does not clearly establish the source from
which a home rule city may claim its power to regulate mixed matters. May the city effectively assert jurisdiction over these matters
on the basis of the powers conferred by the home rule amendment
or must it rely, as a legislative city must, on a statute specifically
delegating regulatory powers to cities of the class in which the city
falls? The earlier cases indicated the home rule amendment was the
source of authority.8 9 However, in the Woolverton case, which involved the power of the city and county of Denver to regulate gambling, the court viewed as significant a statute delegating such power
to cities generally. If the home rule amendment is the source of
authority, then it would seem a statute regulating the same subject
would be relevant only in determing whether a conflict existed or
whether the legislature by its enactment intended to pre-empt the
87. Woolverton v. City & County of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 252, 361 P.2d
982, 984 (1961).
88. Id. at 253, 361 P.2d at 895.
89. See particularly, McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 501, 99
P.2d 969, 972 (1939).
The Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution gives to home rule
cities the right to exercise police power as to local matters, possibly
subject to the limitation that they may not exercise police power in such
manner as to interfere with the state's exercise of its police power
where it has elected to deal with the same subject matter.
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field. And obviously, as was the situation in Woolverton, if the statute
generally delegated the power to cities to regulate the matter, the
lack of any intention by the legislature to pre-empt the field would
be clear. If the source of authority is the home rule amendment, it
would also seem to be true that in the absence of any statute dealing
with the subject, the ordinance would be valid. On the other hand,
if the power of a home rule city to regulate these mixed matters is
dependent upon the legislature's consent, as is the case with legislative cities, then a home rule city's power would seem to depend on a
more or less specific delegation of power from the legislature. Absent such a statute, any ordinance of a home rule city regulating
the matter would be invalid. 90
In the Davis case, the court talked in terms of legislative consent and concluded that the legislature intended to pre-empt the field
because of the absence of any statute delegating or consenting to the
city's exercise of power. In the Woolverton case the court at times
speaks in terms of consent, 9 1 suggesting the necessity of a legislative
delegation. But much of the language in the majority opinion, as
well as the court's reliance on the earlier cases, suggest that the home
rule amendment was Denver's source of authority. Certainly Justices
Frantz and Hall in their dissent 92 assumed that the majority opinion
was premised on the assumption that Denver's authority was derived
from the Constitution, not the delegating statute.
The Davis case might easily have been decided on the ground
that the matter there involved (driving while one's license was suspended) was a matter strictly of statewide concern. 93 Certainly it
is arguable that the offense was just as reprehensible whether it
occurred on a city street or a country lane, whereas gambling, as the
court noted in Woolverton, is a more acute problem in heavily
populated areas. This difference in the cases may explain why in
the Davis case the court spoke as if the home rule city's authority
had to be derived from a statute whereas in Woolverton the implication is that the city's authority was derived from the home rule amendment. Even more significant perhaps is that in the Davis case the
penalty imposed by the ordinance was less severe than that imposed
by the statute. The opposite was true with respect to gambling in
the Woolverton case. What this may suggest is simply that if the
matter is a mixed matter and there is no statute or the statute re90. Authorities cited note 7, 9 supra.
91. Woolverton v. City & County of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 257, 361 P.2d
982, 987 (1961). "If an ordinance and a statute which do not conflict can coexist,
it would follow that a city, acting with the consent of the state, can legislate on
a subject within the legitimate sphere of both its interest and that of the state."
92. Id. at 267, 361 P.2d at 992.
93. In a case decided the same day, the court held it was a matter of statewide concern where the license had been revoked, rather than suspended. City &
County of Denver v. Palmer, 140 Colo. 27, 342 P.2d 687 (1959).
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gulating the subject imposes a lesser penalty than a comparable ordinance of a home rule city, the court may very well sustain the
ordinance, indicating that the city's authority to regulate is derived
from the home rule amendment. If the statute, on the other hand, imposes the greater penalty, the court may talk in terms of consent,
and refuse to sustain the ordinance in absence of a clear-cut delegation. Obviously the source of authority ought to be the same in
either case. But regardless of the source of a home rule city's authority to regulate these mixed matters, the mere existence of a more
stringent state statute is likely to cause the court to consider the
statute as pre-empting the field.
The most cogent argument Justice Frantz makes in his dissent in
the Woolverton case goes to the question of how it can be said, considering the express language of the home rule amendment, particularly section 6, that the amendment was intended to delegate to home
rule cities concurrent jurisdiction over matters which are of both
local and statewide concern. The amendment speaks only of local
and municipal matters when referring to the authority delegated.
The supersession clauses in Section 6 certainly do suggest that the
powers delegated by the amendment are only with reference to matters which are strictly local in their character. A reasonable answer
may lie in the supersession clauses themselves.
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in
such [local and municipal] matters shall supersede within
the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or
town any law of the state in conflict therewith. ***The
statutes of the state . . . so far as applicable, shall continue
to apply to such cities and towns except in so far as superseded by the charters of such cities and
towns or by ordin94
ance passed pursuant to such charters.
Under these provisions supersession does not occur even as to
purely local matters until (1) the city has enacted an ordinance or
adopted a charter provision which (2) conflicts with a state statute.
The exercise of legislative power by the city does not itself necessarily create a conflict and thereby cause supersession. The ordinance
may prohibit or authorize exactly what the statute does. In this
case both continue to be applicable to and in the home rule city. 95
The category of mixed matters (e.g., gambling, or the regulation
of peddlers) are by definition of local and and municipal concern.
By the home rule amendment a city would therefore seem to have
authority to regulate them. But what of the supersession clauses?
94. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
95. This analysis is based on the express language of the supersession
clauses. The court has never specifically so held. Under the mutual exclusion
doctrine as stated in the Merris case, a conflict would arise simply by the home
rule city's enactment of a regulation. It would not matter that the ordinance
and the statute imposed the same penalties for exactly the same conduct.
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These matters are also by definition of statewide concern and it
would doubtless be unwise to apply the supersession clauses to them
and thereby deprive the legislature of ultimate regulatory power
over them in home rule cities. Supersession, however, does not become a problem unless the ordinance and statute conflict, as would
occur, for example, were Denver to authorize gambling generally.
When a city does enact such an ordinance which conflicts with
the state's legislative policy, it could be argued that the city, by the
enactment of the ordinance itself, causes the matter of regulation
within that city to become entirely a matter of statewide concern.
It would seem, for example, to be a matter of statewide concern,
that is, be of significant interest to people living outside the home
rule city, if the city were to authorize conduct which by statute has
been prohibited. An ordinance regulating a matter involving a
statewide interest in a manner contrary to the declared public policy
of the state would clearly seem to become a matter of statewide concern. However, if the ordinance is consistent with the declared
public policy of the state, the fact that a home rule city may impose
more stringent penalties because local conditions in the particular
city tend to cause the prohibited conduct to occur more frequently
or have more severe consequences, then it is difficult to see how the
city's more strict control could be said to be a matter of statewide
concern in the absence of a legislative determination to that effect.
It may be said where the ordinance is less severe than the statute,
the failure of the city to treat the matter (which involves a statewide interest) as seriously as the state does also renders the whole
matter of regulation a matter of statewide concern. This would explain why the court, when it has permitted municipal regulation of
these mixed matters, has done so either when the ordinance was
more severe than the state statute or when there was no statute at all.
Viewing the matter in this light, the question becomes one of the
interpretation and application of the supersession clauses. Nothing
in the home rule amendment itself necessarily precludes the separation of the question of authority to regulate from the question of
whose authority should prevail in the event of conflict. As to "strictly
local" matters, concurrent regulation is permissible until the city
decides and does create a conflict. Do the supersession clauses prevent the same approach from being adopted with reference to matters of mutual concern to cities and state, but reserving, in this instance, the final authority in the legislature? The majority of the
court have apparently concluded that the supersession clauses do not
prohibit this result.96
96.

It will be noted that this approach

to home rule is similar to that

adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for adjusting the respective regulatory powers
of the states and Congress over interstate commerce.
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The recognition of a category of mixed matters over which a
home rule city may exercise (until preempted) concurrent legislative
jurisdiction with the General Assembly lends a useful flexibility to
the home rule amendment. 97 Admittedly where a statute and an
ordinance conflict, and the subject could be reasonably classed as
strictly local or mixed, the court is likely to view the matter as mixed,
rather than strictly local, and hold the ordinance invalid under the
preemption doctrine. The tendency will therefore probably be to
classify fewer and fewer subjects as strictly local. Even so, when
there is no statute, the city is free to regulate according to its needs,
within the limits of the constitution, without the necessity of an express
legislative authorization. Matters which need prompt attention can
be more expeditiously attended to. The practical political choice
of reserving or not reserving exclusive regulatory powers over the
subject matter is placed in the hands of the legislature. The court,
of course, is not likely to have fewer cases to decide, but in fewer
cases will the court have to assume the awesome responsibility of
saying to the legislature or a home rule city that it lacks power to
regulate at all.
The recognition of a category of mixed matters under the home
rule amendment is not unattended by other difficulties, both theoretical and practical. Justice Frantz argued in his dissent in Woolverton that to imply a concurrent power in home rule cities to regulate
mixed matters under the home rule amendment is to permit a delegation of the legislature's powers, which is specifically prohibited by the
constitution unless the constitution itself otherwise expressly directs
or permits. One difficulty with this argument is that article III on
which Justice Frantz relies was designed to assure a separation of
powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government and consequently only specifically prohibits the delegation of legislative powers to another coordinate branch of the state
government.) 8 The court has, of course, construed the provision as
prohibiting the delegation of legislative powers generally, but it has
done so on the basis of implication. 9: 1 Section 8 of the home rule
97. McGoldrick suggested nearly thirty years ago that one of the basic dif-

ficulties with home rule was the lack of any "mechanism for the handling of
problems in which there is both state and local interest." McGOLDRicK, LAW AND
PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 1916-1930, 317 (1933).
He suggested that the
lack of any such mechanism with the consequent necessity of having to classify all
matters as either strictly local or strictly statewide would "all but destroy municipal home rule."
98. CoLo. CONsT. art. III provides:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
departments, - the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging
to one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging
to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed
or permitted.
99. E.g., Prouty v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1953).
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amendment could be construed as rendering article III inapplicable
to the problem since it provides that other inconsistent or conflicting
constitutional provisions shall be inapplicable to matters "covered
and provided for" by the home rule amendment. The basic problem would, therefore, still seem to be whether the home rule amendment "covered and provided for" the regulation of local matters by
home rule cities when such matters also involve a statewide interest.
It seems as reasonable to imply such a grant of power as it does to
imply a prohibition from article Il against the delegation generally
of any legislative powers.
Another problem which seems to have bothered those members
of the court1 00 who have favored the doctrine of mutual exclusion
is that of double jeopardy. 1 1 Under the doctrine of mutual exclusion, this problem is avoided since if the matter is local, only the
municipality can validly regulate it, whereas, if it is statewide, only the
state can regulate it. It is not possible to have both a valid statute
and a valid ordinance punishing the same conduct when it occurs in
a home rule city. However, under the doctrine that both the state
and a home rule city may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over mixed
matters the statute and the ordinance may both be valid and consequently punishment could be imposed under either. As the supersession clauses are worded, this situation can also exist when the matter
is considered "strictly local." As has been noted, 10 2 when the matter
is strictly local, a statute dealing with the subject is not superseded
by an ordinance which also deals with the subject unless the ordinance
and statute conflict. A "conflict" would not seem to exist, as the
court has defined it,1(i3 when the ordinance and the statute punish
the same conduct with the same degree of severity.
The solution to the double jeopardy problem would appear to
be relatively simple, especially since the court has now taken the
position that any conduct for which a municipal ordinance imposes a
penalty, either in the form of a fine or term of imprisonment, consitutes a crime.11 4 Obviously, the fact that a home rule city may
derive its power from the state constitution should not change the
basic law that the city is an agency of the state. Such being the case,
a prosecution by the city is a prosecution by the state and should
serve to bar the state, acting through another agency, from conducting a second prosecution for the same misconduct. Similarly a prosecution by the state through its regular criminal processes should
100. See, e.g., City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169. 181, 323 P.2d 614,
620 (1958), with Justice Frantz writing for the majority.
101.

Prohibited by COLO. CONST. art.

11, § 18.

102. Note 95 supra.
103. A conflict exists if the ordinance prohibits what the statute permits or
vice versa. Ray v. City & County of Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942).
104. City of Pueblo v. Clemmer, 375 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1962).
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bar a second prosecution by the city.'"- Justice Doyle in the Wool-

verton case made it clear the decision in that case was not intended
to permit double prosecutions or to revive the prior notion that proceedings for violations of municipal ordinances were civil in nature.
"The mere fact that the city has the power to legislate does not
mean that there could ever be recognition of dual sovereignty or
'1 0
double prosecutions. 6
Even if double prosecutions could not be had, there remains
the problem of which agency-the state or the city-should assume the
task of prosecution. To some extent the court could regulate this
matter by the way it defines "conflict." If the matter being regulated
is a mixed matter and the ordinance imposes a lesser penalty than the
statute, then if the city is permitted to prosecute first, the state's
interest will not receive the protection the legislature deemed necessary. To date in this situation the court has found the ordinance
invalid on the theory that the state had not consented to the municipality's regulation.J0T A better theory would be that of preemption,
that is, that the legislature intended to preempt he field at least to the
extent of requiring a minimum penalty. Under either view, the
state's right to protect the state's interest by a state prosecuion is
preserved. Where the ordinance is more severe than the statute, a
prosecution under the ordinance necessarily protects the state's interest to the fullest extent intended" 0s and there seems to be no reason
for not permitting a city from protecting its interests under a municipal prosecution. This is, of course, the arrangement the court has
worked out by readily sustaining municipal prosecutions under ordinances which pursue the same policies as the state statutes but which
do so more stringently.
When the matter is "strictly local" it is probably advisable to find
a conflict and hence supersession barring a state prosecution whenever the ordinance and the statute are not identical, both as to the conduct regulated and the penalty imposed. Whenever the matter is
strictly local, the city has a right to treat the matter either more or less
seriously than the state legislature. In either case if the state is permited to prosecute first and thereby bar a municipal prosecution, the
state will be interfering with the enforcement of a policy determination which by the home rule amendment the city should be entitled to
control. Only if the state regulates the matter in exactly the same
105. Comment, 72 HARV. L. REv. 737, 747-748 (1959). For an excellent discussion of this point as well as other procedural problems suggested by the Merris
case, see also, Scott, Municipal Penal Ordinances in Colorado, 30 RocKy MT.L. REv.
267 (1958).

106. Woolverton v. City 8:County of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 283, 361 P.2d 982,
990 (1961).
107. Davis v. City & County of Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 342 P.2d 674 (1959).
108. This assumes that the competency of the courts and the prosecutors, be
they state or municipal, are about the same.
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way and imposes the same punishment can such interference through
a state prosecution be avoided.
THE POWER OF THE STATE TO REGULATE MATTERS OF
STRICTLY LOCAL CONCERN

The competing doctrines of mutual exclusion and concurrent
jurisdiction have been developed by the court primarily in cases involving the question of a home rule city's power to regulate matters
under the home rule amendment. These doctrines are not without
significance, however, when consideration is given to the power of the
state to regulate matters strictly of local interest. Often this question
is phrased in terms of the municipality's power, that is: to what extent may a home rule city disregard its power to regulate a local matter under its constitutional powers and rely instead on a statute conferring on cities generally powers to regulate a local matter in a particular way? Though the question may be phrased in terms of municipal power, the crux of the matter is the state's power to regulate local
and municipal affairs.
An important statute which illustrates this problem is the Improvement Districts Act of 1949.109 Suppose certain residents of a
home rule city decided to avail themselves of the provisions of this
statute for the purpose of establishing a parking district within their
city. The act is specifically made applicable to home rule cities.'"
Under the provisions of the statute, the organization of the district is
begun by filing a petition praying for its creation signed by a majority
of the taxpaying electors of the city who own property in the district
"having an assessed value of not less than one half of the assessed
value of all . . . property"'1 1 in the proposed district. The petition
is filed with the governing body of the city which is given authority
to create such districts under the statute. 1 2 After a hearing, the
city council may reject the petition if it finds it insufficient in the
number of required signatures, or if it decides that the proposed
improvement will not benefit the district or that the cost is excessive
when compared to the value of the property within the district. If
the council's findings are favorable to the creation of the district, the
council by ordinance must declare the district created."13
By the statute such a district is given a separate, though limited,
corporate status."' The members of the city council become the district's board of directors, and the corporate officers of the city become
the corporate officers of the district.",, The district is given power
109.
110.
111.

112.
113.
114.
115.

CoLo.
COLO.
COLO.
COLO.
COLO.
COLO.
COLO.

REV.
REV.
REV.
REV.
REV.
REV.
REV.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

§§ 89-4-1 to -30 (1953).
§ 89-4-2 (Perm. Supp.
§ 89-4-4 (1953).

§§ 89-4-3, -7 (1953).
§ 89-4-7 (1953).
§ 89-4-7 (1953).
§ 89-4-9 (1953).

1960).
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to construct improvements, borrow money, issue bonds, condemn
private property, impose and collect service charges, levy ad valorem
taxes on property within the district, and so forth.1 16
One of the reasons for using these separately incorporated districts within a city or a town is to avoid the constitutional limitations
on municipal debts." 7 In Anderson v. Town of Westminster," the
court specifically held such a district created within a legislative city
was not subject to these constitutional limitations. Since the immediate tax burden rests only on those who own property within
the district and who, presumably, are the principal recipients of the
benefits, the use of such districts also permits a more equitable allocation of the tax burdens without (probably) violating the uniformity requirement of article X, section 3.
Are the citizens of home rule cities to be deprived of these and
possibly other benefits, because they have chosen to adopt the status
of a home rule city rather than remaining a legislative city? Or may
they, if they deem it advisable, continue to exercise the powers conferred upon legislative cities of their class? Under the doctrine of
mutual exclusion these benefits would be lost, for the activities of
such a district would affect strictly local matters and consequently
be beyond the legislative domain of the state legislature to control.
With the exception of the court's recent decision in the MCID 119
case, the court has uniformly rejected this result. As the court noted
in the Woolverton case: "To hold that a statutory city has more power
20
than a home rule city would be anomalous indeed."'
Not only would such a conclusion be anomalous, it would also
be contrary to the express language of the home rule amendment.
Section 6 specifically provides that the statutes of the state shall continue to be applicable to home rule cities except as superseded by the
charter or ordinances, and such supersession does not occur unless
a conflict exists. Properly then, a home rule city may exercise such
powers as the legislature has conferred upon cities of the same class
over strictly local matters. Only if the citizens of the city or their
council choose not to have such powers, and they express their desire
by the enactment of a conflicting ordinance or by the adoption of a
conflicting charter provision, is the city deprived of such powers.
The supersession clauses do not divest the legislature of its power
to regulate strictly local matters of a home rule city; only conflicting
ordinances or charter provisions can do this. The home rule city
116.
117.
118.

119.
Country
120.
982, 990

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 89-4-11, -12, -20 (1953).
CoLo. CONsr. art. X1, § 8.
125 Colo. 408, 244 P.2d 371 (1952).

Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of
Comm'rs 149 Colo. 284, 369 P.2d 67 (1962).
Woolverton v. City & County of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 263, 361 P.2d
(1961).
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may therefore, if it likes, accept the legislative regulation for whatever advantages it may appear to offer.
As early as 1919, the court adopted this view, upholding the power
of a home rule city to levy a special assessment against property owned
by a county. The city's right to collect the special assessment, said
the court, could be upheld either under the general laws or the home
rule amendment. 12 In People ex rel. Stokes v. Newton, 122 the argument was made that the Denver Housing Authority, created by the
city under a general statute, 1' 3 was without corporate existence because the statute, insofar as home rule cities were concerned, was an
unconstitutional exercise of legislative powers over matters strictly of
local concern. The relator contended that to permit the establishment of such an authority, a city charter amendment was required.
The court rejected the relator's contentions and in so doing rejected
as to strictly local matters any theory of mutual exclusion.
Realtor's theory is that the state has lost all jurisdiction
over a home-rule city in matters of local and municipal
concern. The theory is untenable [in view of the supersession
clause of § 6, article XX].
* * . Denver has not amended its charter so as to take
advantage of provisions of the National Housing Act. There
is no contention that the present charter forbids such action.
Assuming, but not deciding, that the authority granted to
Denver by [the state statute] ...

is a matter of local concern

. .. Denver not having exercised the authority -4to legislate by
amending its charter, the state law controls."
A similar constitutional attack based on article XX was recently
made on the Urban Renewal Law of 1958.125 In an original prohibition proceeding in the supreme court,' 2 6 the petitioner contended
that the statute and ordinances creating the Urban Renewal Authority
of Denver were unconstitutional in that they conferred on the Authority the power of eminent domain which by article XX and the
Denver City Charter had been conferred upon the city. Consequently
the enabling statute and the ordinances establishing the Authority,
it was argued, unconstitutionally delegated powers reserved to the
city. Quoting with approval its decision in the Stokes case, the court
dismissed the argument:
The case of People ex rel. Stokes v. Newton . . . is authority for the principle that the state may, in the absence of
local legislation, adopt a uniform statewide legislative pro121. Board of Conim'rs v. City of Colorado Springs, 66 Colo. 111, 180 Pac.
301 (1919).
122.

123.
124.
125.
126.

106 Colo. 61, 101 P.2d 21 (1940).
Now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 69-3-1 to -32 (1953).

People ex rel. Stokes v. Newton, 106 Colo. 61, 66, 101 P.2d 21, 24 (1940).
Now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 139-62-1 to -14 (Perm. Supp. 1960).
Rabinoff v. District Court, 145 Colo. 225, 360 P.2d 114 (1961).
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gram even though the subject has a local or 12 municipal
7
character where the municipality has not acted.
These cases left little doubt that under the home rule amendment the legislature could exercise concurrent jurisdiction over matters strictly of local concern to home rule cities unless the city itself
decided to assert its jurisdiction in a way which conflicted with that
exercised by the state. The MCID case,' 28 however, seems to have
rejected this doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction in preference to
that of mutual exclusion.
In 1961 the General Assembly 29 authorized the creation of metropolitan capital improvement districts for any metropolitan area, which
by the law was defined as being any "contiguous area consisting of one
or more counties in their entriety, each of which has an average
population density of at least fifteen persons per square mile."' 130 Following the traditional pattern for the creation of districts by petition
and election, the statute authorized any governing board of any
county within the proposed district (or any governing body of any
city or town with more than 30 per cent of a county's population)
to petition the district court for creation of the district. 13 After a
judicial determination of the sufficiency of the petition, the court
was required to call an election. If a majority of those voting approved the creation of the district, the court was required to declare
the district established. 32 The Board of Directors of the district,
in the case of a multi-county district, were to be selected, directly or
indirectly, by officials of the counties and municipalities located within
the district.' 33 The statute conferred upon the district a corporate
status. The statute also conferred upon the district authority
to levy a sales tax.' 34 A fund for each local unit within the
district was to be established to which was to be credited "that
part of the total proceeds of the revenue from any district sales and
use tax which is available for construction of capital improvements
or acquisition of capital equipment requested by such local unit."
The net tax revenues collected within each county were made available to local units within each county; and the allocation among
local units within each county was to be made on the basis of popula35
tion.
127. Id. at 240, 360 P.2d at 122.
128. Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 360 P.2d 67 1962).
129. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 89-17-1 to -23 (Supp. 1961), repealed, Colo. Sess.
Laws 1963, ch. 203, § 1.
130. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-17-2 (2) (Supp. 1961). The statute was so
drafted (§ 89-17-3) that in the Denver metropolitan area, Denver, as well as the
adjoining three counties, had to be included in any district created in that particular area.
131. COLO. REV. SrA. ANN. §§ 89-17-4 to -6 (Supp. 1961).
132. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 89-17-7 to -11 (Supp. 1961).
133. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-17-12 (Supp. 1961).
134. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 89-17-13, -14 (Supp. 1961).
135. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-17-15 (Supp. 1961).
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Only funds allocated to a local unit could be spent by the district for improvements or capital equipment within that unit. And
such improvements could not be made by the district unless requested
by the local unit. Under the act, any request for a capital improvement or item of capital equipment had to be approved by the Board
of Directors unless three-fourths of the members determined that the
project did ". . . not conform to one or more of the standards of
metropolitan coordination developed by it .......
130
Upon completion of a project or acquisition of an item of capital equipment,
title to the property was to be conveyed by the district to the requesting local unit or units.'Y7
The four county district held invalid in the MCID case was
created under this statute. In holding the act unconstitutional as a
violation of article XX, the court reverted back to a theory of mutual
exclusion.
Considering the history of the home rule movement in Colorado,' 3 8 no one can honestly dispute the court's basic holding that:
"[t]here can be no doubt that the activities contemplated by the
district board of directors involve 'local and municipal matters'."' 39
What can be disputed is the court's final conclusion that because this
is so, the act is unconstitutional. The court's prior decisions render
this conclusion unsound. The relevant decisions are not those which
upheld such super-districts as the Moffat Tunnel Improvement District 40 and the Pueblo Conservancy District' 4 1 which included home

rule cities. The objectives contemplated by those districts were
obviously beyond the scope of the local and municipal affairs of the
included cities.

The relevant cases are those noted above which

firmly established the General Assembly's concurrent legislative
jurisdiction over the local and municipal affairs of home rule cities
in the absence of conflicting municipal regulation.
It is true that sections 1 and 6 render nothing more certainly a
matter of local concern than local improvements. But it is not true
that

[a]fter the adoption of Article XX all the home rule cities
within the 'Four-County District' . . . had all the power that

could be acquired by anyone to govern with relation to their
local and municipal affairs ... [and that by] the Home Rule
Amendment the General Assembly had been deprived of all
136. COLO.
137.

REV. STAT. ANN.
STA'r. ANN.

COLO. REV.

§§

89-17-13 (6), -16, -17 (Supp. 1961).

§ 89-17-19

(Supp. 1961).

138. Notes 10-20 supra.
139. Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 296, 369 P.2d 67, 73 (1962).
140. Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 72 Colo. 268, 211 Pac. 649
(1922), aff'd, 262 U.S. 710 (1923).
141. People ex rel. Setters v. Lee, 72 Colo. 598, 213 Pac. 583 (1923).
See also
People ex rel. Rogers v. Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 79 P.2d 274 (1938).
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the power it might otherwise have had to142
legislate concerning
matters of local and municipal concern.
The express language of section 6 of article XX belie these conclusions.
'The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable,
shall continue to apply to such cities and towns, except in so
far as superseded by the charters of such cities and towns or
by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.'
(Italics
added.)
The court itself seemed to recognize it was overstating its case
when it noted:
Particularly is this true [the proposition that Article XX
divested the General Assembly of power over local matters in
a home rule city] where a home rule city has
adopted a
143
charter or ordinances governing such matters.
The question the court should have addressed itself to was
whether or not a conflict existed between the statute and various
home rule city charters. Had the court (lone this, it would, of course,
have reached the same result in the MCID case, for as the court
itself notes, the Denver city charter conflicts with the statute by
providing that the duties of managing, designing, and constructing
all general public improvements are vested exclusively in the Department of Public Works. 4 4 This approach would not have rendered
the statute unconstitutional as a violation of article XX. Rather
it simply would have rendered Denver's participation in the district impossible. And since the validity of the district under the
statute and under the election was dependent upon the lawful inclusion of Denver, the district would have been defective in its organization.
In terms of its potential long range effect on the law of municipal home rule, the decision in the MCID case is disturbing not because of the specific result but because of the reasoning adopted by
the court in reaching its conclusion. Consider the implications of
these dicta:
When the people by constitutional provision have lodged exclusive power in a political subdivision of government such
as a home rule city, that power may be exercised only by
the entity to which it was granted, and the home rule city
cannot delegate the power elsewhere. Neither can the General Assembly re-invest itself with any portion of the authority
it lost to home145rule cities upon the adoption of Article XX
by the people.
142. Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of County

Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 294, 369 P.2d 67, 72 (1962).
143. Id. at 294, 369 P.2d at 72.
144. Id. at 295-96, 369 P.2d at 73.

145. Id. at 295, 369 P.2d at 72.
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The very essence of a 'Home Rule City' is embodied in
the constitutional mandate that in its local and municipal
affairs the city has full, complete, and exclusive authority.
powerless to change this essential conThe legislature is 146
cept of home rule.
The essential concept of home rule is that a home rule city
may, as to local matters, free itself from legislative control or direction but only if it chooses to do so. Its "exclusive authority" is only
a latent one. Section 6 clearly preserves the power of the General
Assembly, in the absence of conflicting municipal legislation, to control or provide direction for the regulation of local affairs. How
can the exercise of a power clearly reserved to the legislature by
the constitution be considered a "reinvestment" of power?
As to the power of a home rule city to delegate control over local
and municipal affairs, the case suggests this rather remarkable rule:
because of the home rule amendment, the legislature may not authorize
a home rule city to exercise any of its powers over local affairs by
creating a separate corporate governmental body and delegating to
that body any of its home rule powers. If this is to be the rule, districts created under the Improvement Districts Act of 1949, Urban
Renewal Authorities, Housing Authorities, and other cooperative
efforts between home rule cities and other governmental units147 are
unconstitutional. The court might distinquish some of these "delegations" on the degree of control retained by the home rule cities over
the activities of the subordinate govermental unit. For example, under
the 1949 act the district board of directors as well as its officers are
the city's own legislative and executive officers',' 48 and under the
Urban Renewal Act, the city's legislative body retains substantial
control over the Authority's activities. 149 The dictum of the MCID
case, however, would seem to render all these "delegations" invalid
regardless of their limited scope.
If they are invalid in the case of home rule cities, then they must
also be invalid in the case of legislative cities, for the utilization of
such statutes by a home rule city makes such cities, in effect, legislative cities. The home rule city's claim of authority to act in the
premises is based on a statutory grant of authority, not a constitutional
one. To say that a legislative city could utilize such statutes, but a
home rule city could not, would run counter to the basic purpose
of the home rule amendment, that is, to broaden the powers of home
rule cities to deal with local and municipal problems. The amend146.

Id. at 304, 369 P.2d at 77 (on rehearing).

147. E.g., municipal-county cooperation in the maintenance of public libraries,
now permitted under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-1-10 (1953).
148. Note 115 supra.
149. COLO. REV. S'FAT. ANN. § 139-62-7 (Perm. Supp. 1960) requires that urban
renewal plans developed by an authority be approved by the municipality's governing body before they are undertaken.
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ment was not intended to divest them of whatever powers they might
have had had they remained a legislative city. What other reason
can explain the carelul drafting of the supersession clauses in section
6 if it was not to preserve to home rule cities such of the legislative
grants of power the home rule city might find useful in solving its
local and municipal problems?
It is arguable that the reasoning of the MCID case does not
seriously impair the powers of a home rule city since if the matters
are exclusively local in character, the home rule amendment confers
legislative authority upon the municipality to deal with them. As
has been noted, in the absence of charter limitations, the legislative
body of the city is vested with authority to act with reference to
such matters. 1 0 The difficulty with this argument is that while
many of the activities of such separate coroporate bodies are matters of local and municipal concern, the creation of such districts
and authorities is probably not. Who but the most ardent advocate
of municipal home rule would suggest that the home rule amendment
conferred authority on home rule cities to create separate corporate
entities? The activities of these entities may be local, but in carrying out their activities, important powers must be exercised which
traditionally are dependent upon a grant from the sovereign, for
example, the power of eminent domain and the taxing power. If
Justice Moore's dictum concerning delegation has merit, it would
seem to be in this context. It is quite doubtful that the home rule
amendment contemplated that a home rule city, as such, could create
a separate corporate entity and confer or delegate to such a body the
important governmental powers the city had received from the constitution. The creation of such corporate bodies is not a matter
strictly of local concern, although many, if not most, of their activities may be. The capacity to sue or to enter into contracts, affecting
as it does the rights of persons who may deal with such bodies, amply
illustrates this. And if the liability of a home rule city itself to a
third preson on a contract or a tort claim is a matter of general state
law, as it surely is,l51 it must also be true of these subordinate corporate bodies. It would seem to follow that the legal existence of
such corporate bodies must be a matter involving, at least to some
degree, a statewide interest.
If the power to call these bodies into legal existence is a matter
involving statewide interest, the state does have a power to regulate.
Further, if this power to create separate corporate bodies is viewed
as a matter exclusively of statewide concern, then only the legislature
150. Notes 33-35 supra.
151.

(1960).

See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826
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can prescribe the manner of creation and the scope of their powers.
If the manner of creation is a matter of exclusively statewide concern,
then any home rule city which desired to carry on some of its activities through subordinate corporate, governmental bodies could only
claim authority to create such bodies by way of the statute itself. To
deny them this power on a theory of nondelegability of home rule
legislative powers would be as absurd as denying private individuals
the power to create a private corporation under the general corporation laws.
If the power to create these separate corporate bodies is considered
a mixed matter, then a home rule city could claim authority under
the home rule amendment to create them. 1 3 But such authority on
the part of the city would be subject to legislative preemption. Consequently, to assure greater stability of the legal status of such bodies
and of contract rights of persons who might deal with them, any
home rule city would be prudent to rely on a statute rather than the
home rule amendment for authority to create these subordinate corporate entities.
In effect, the reasoning of the MCID case divests the legislature
of its power to authorize the creation of subordinate corporate bodies
to aid home rule cities in the performance of their local functions. All
of this is quite remarkable if the creation of such bodies is indeed a
matter involving statewide interests, for the home rule amendment
has never before been construed to reach this result.
Surely, as the court noted in the Sweet case,154 the home rule
amendment was not intended to create independent city states. But
just as surely, the home rule amendment was not intended to make
home rule cities orphan cities by depriving them of the right to look
to the legislature for such additional powers they, as cities, might
need or could effectively use, but which they could not claim under
the constitution as a home rule city.
The reasoning of the MCID case does not represent a victory
for the advocates of municipal home rule, although the particular
result does. The reasoning and much of the dicta cast long shadows
on the effeciency of municipal home rule in Colorado.

This is not to say that the alternative reasoning suggested does
not present any problems. Suppose, for example, the charter of
Denver did not contain a provision which conflicted with the statute
and thereby rendered Denver's participation in the district impossible
and the election on which the district depended invalid. How could
Denver or another home rule city exclude itself from the district if
152.
(1959).
153 .
154.

Supra note 120; In re Senate Bill No. 72, 139 Colo. 371, 3S3-PF.2d 501
Supra note 120.
City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441

(1958).
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it chose to do so? It could, of course, enact a provision similar to
Denver's and thereby divest the district of power to construct public
improvements of a strictly local nature in the city. But what of the
sales tax levy? Could the city council simply enact a prohibition
against the levy and collection of the tax? This clearly would
create a conflict and under the supersession clauses the municipal
legislation would prevail. If this approach could be used, 155 any
home rule city which chose to, would not, it seems, have been defenseless against the district had the court in the MCID case adopted
a theory of concurrent jurisdiction as opposed to that of exclusive
jurisdiction.
But it may not always be so easy for a home rule city to make its
jurisdiction exclusive if it should decide to do so. Suppose, for
example, a home rule city does take advantage of a state statute
authorizing the creation of a subordinate corporate body and it is
later decided that the assistance is no longer desirable or necessary.
Can it now destroy or somehow disable what has since become an
intermeddler in local and municipal affairs? If it cannot, Justice
Moore's dictum against delegation makes a great deal of sense.
Otherwise one city council could effectively divest a later city council,
and indeed the citizens themselves, of the ultimate control over local
and municipal affairs which the home rule amendment was intended
to confer. 156
Touching this point the court has decided only one case, People
ex rel. Stokes v. Newton. 15 7 In that case, the court indicated the
subordinate body, the housing authority, was a state agency, not a
municipal agency, and, after its creation, was beyond the control of
the municipality, except to the extent the statute provided otherwise.
"The Denver Housing Authority is an independent entity, not subject to the charter of Denver, though the city forms a part of the
district."158

The territorial limits of the district exceeded those of the city
and, as a result, this statement is not surprising. But the implication
that once having created the authority, the city is bound to tolerate
what may become serious intermeddling in local affairs is hardly consistent with the fundamental purposes of home rule.
To the extent that the municipality can control the important
155. Since the district tax would not be a state tax, the prohibition in § 5
of article XX preventing a home rule from interfering "in any wise with the
collection of state taxes" would not seem to be applicable.
156. Under the 1949 Act, the General Assembly has wisely sought to avoid
this problem by providing: "No . . . improvement or facility [of the district]
shall duplicate or interfere with any municipal improvement already constructed
or planned to be constructed within the limits of such district." CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 89-4-2 (Perm. Supp. 1960).
157. 106 Colo. 61, 101 P.2d 21 (1940).
158.

Id. at 68, 101 P.2d at 24.
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activities of these separate corporate bodies, as is the case with Urban
Renewal Authorities and districts created under the 1949 Act, no
serious problem is created. Even so, if home rule cities are permitted
to utilize separate corporate bodies to perform local functions, they
must not be held to have surrendered their ultimate control over the
activities of such bodies which are strictly local. They must be permitted to retain, in one form or another, a veto power, for otherwise, home rule will be permitted to destroy itself.
The opinion of the court in the MCID case should not be taken as
establishing a complete roadblock to the solution of common problems
in metropolitan areas. There is authority for the proposition that
what may have been a local and municipal affair can cease to be such
and become a matter of more general concern, the regulation of which
is subject to state control.'' 9 In a metropolitan area such matters as
sanitation (including air pollution) , public transportation and police
and fire protection are likely to undergo this metamorphosis. Contrary to the suggestion made by the court in the MCID case, nothing,
at least in the home rule amendment, requires that these metropolitan
problems be solved by the creation of a traditional district in which is
vested an ad valorem taxing power or in which ownership of property
must be maintained. It is apparent that much imagination will have
to be exercised to develop new governmental structures to solve many
of these problems effectively. The home rule amendment may create
some legal problems, but as long as the subject matter is not strictly
local and municipal, the specific holding in the MCID case does not
add to the complexities of those problems.
The problems created by the MCID decision relate only to matters which are strictly local and municipal. Even in these areas, of
course, it may be sensible to deal with a particular matter on a metropolitan basis, for example, public libraries. The MCID decision
would seem to prohibit cooperative efforts between home rule cities,
non-home rule cities and counties, even though the legislature made it
possible, either by simply authorizing such cooperation between such
units on a more or less informal basis or by authorizing the
creation of separate corporate entities through which such cooperation could be achieved. If we are ever to achieve more effective forms of local government units, experimentation is desirable.
Seemingly the most useful experimentation will be that based on
cooperation-cooperation between the General Assembly and all
other interested subordinance governmental units. The regrettable effect of the MCID decision is that it may close the door to important
opportunities for fruitful experimentation. The decision is all the
159. Supra note 41. See also People ex rel. Public Utilities Comm'n. v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952), where the
court recognized this possibility, but did not rely on it in reaching its decision.
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more lamentable because it was rendered on a wholly unnecessary
interpretation of the home rule amendment, the very provision which
by giving a freedom of experimentation has done much to improve the
govermental structures of our municipalities.
DIVESTMENT OF HOME RULE POWERS BY
SUBSEQUENT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

The powers conferred by article XX on home rule cities, having
been granted by the constitution, can be divested by subsequent constitutional amendment. 160 In 1944, for example, section 14, article
XII was added, requiring cities when making civil service appointments to give a preference to veterans. The provision is specifically
made applicable to "cities . . . chartered under the XXth amendment." In 1954, article XXV was added to the constitution for the
explicit purpose of divesting home rule cities of certain regulatory
powers over privately owned public utilities operating within their
territorial limits.
Article XXII placed the power to regulate the manufacture, sale
and distribution of intoxicating liquors exclusively within the control
of the legislature. Such regulation is to:
• . . be performed exclusively by or through such agencies
and under such regulations as may hereafter be provided
by statutory laws of the state .... 161
This provision does not mean that a home rule city may not regulate
matters relating to intoxicating liquors. It does mean that they
may do so only as legislative cities, that is, under an express grant of
authority from the legislature. They can claim no regulatory power
62
by virtue of the home rule amendment.'
In addition to the divestment of home rule powers which may
occur because of express provisions in subsequent constitutional
amendments, the court, has also held such divestment may be implied
from subsequent amendments, as, for example, in the case of the
64
income tax amendment. 1 63 In City & County of Denver v. Sweet,'
the court held this subsequently enacted provision, by conferring authority in the General Assembly to levy an income tax, preempted
160.

161.
162.
Denver
(1939) ;
1244

City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441

(1958).

COLO. CONST. art XXII.
Geer v. Rabinoff, 138 Colo. 8, 328 P.2d 375 (1958); City & County of
v. The People, 103 Colo. 565, 88 P.2d 89, appeal dismissed, 307 U.S. 615
City of Colorado Springs v. People ex rel. Campbell, 99 Colo. 525, 63 P.2d

(1936).

163. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 17 (added 1936)
The general assembly may levy income taxes, either graduated or proportional, or both graduated and proportional, for the support of the
state, or any political subdivision thereof, or for public schools, and may,
in the administration of an income tax law, provide for special classified or limited taxation or the exemption of tangible and intangible
personal property.
164. City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958).
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whatever authority a home rule city might otherwise have had under
article XX. The court assumed that by adopting the income tax
amendment the people intended to make this form of taxation exclusively a matter of statewide concern. The ultimate conclusion
may be sound,' 6 but the reasoning is not convincing.' 66 The salutary reluctance of courts to find repeals or amendments by implications ought to be at its highest when dealing with constitutional provisions. Yet this principle was not followed in deciding the Sweet
case. Clearly if the grant of power contained in article X, section 17
was necessary before any part of the state government could constitutionally levy an income tax, then it is probably fair to view the section
as conferring such authority only upon the governmental agency
specifically named. On the other hand, if the provision was intended
to be only declaratory of an already existing power in the General
Assembly, there would seem to be no warrant for concluding that by
its adoption the people of Colorado intended to preempt whatever
power home rule cities might otherwise have constitutionally claimed
under article XX. When it has been the desire of the people to divest
home rule cities of control over certain local matters, they have had
no difficulty making their intention clear, either by making the provision specifically applicable to such cities' 67 or by stating clearly that
a certain power was vested exclusively in the General Assembly."",
With any form of legislation, it is not possible to foresee all of
the possible or apparent conflicts a new proposal may create with
existing provisions. When, as in the Sweet case, it is apparent that
the lawmakers did not foresee the apparent conflict, it is a fiction to
resolve the problem on the basis of some presumed intent. The
better practice would seem to be for the court first to determine if
an actual conflict exists, that is, whether it is or is not possible to
give meaningful effect to the purposes of both the old and the new
provisions. Only if an actual conflict does exist would it seem
necessary to imply any intent on the part of the lawmakers to abandon
the old in favor of the new. Considering the importance of the home
rule amendment to the people of Colorado, it is difficult to believe
that those who voted in favor of the income tax amendment intended
to divest home rule cities of whatever power they might have had under
article XX to levy a similar tax. If this is true, the Sweet case should
165. For a more exhaustive discussion of the Sweet case, see Comment, 35

ROCKY MT. L. REV. 370, 382-390

(1963).

166. E.g., "Clearly our federal system does not envisage as a part thereof citystates. It therefore follows that home rule cities can be only an arm or branch
of the state with delegated power." City : County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo.
41, 48, 329 P.2d 441, 444 (1958). This may all be true, but it does not answer
the question of whether or not the home rule amendment in conferring powers
over local affairs included the power to levy an income tax for local purposes on
1he local inhabitants.
167. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. XXV (1954) (regulation of privately owned public
utilities operating in home rule cities).
168. E.g., CoLo. CONST. art. XXII (1932) (regulation of intoxicating liquors).
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have been decided on the basis of whether or not under article XX
such power ever existed in home rule cities. Conceivably, the court
might have concluded that it did not.
Premised as it is oa a theory of presumed intent, the doctrine of
implied divestment advanced by the court in the Sweet case requires
the court to speculate as to the state of mind of the electorate. Since
any error in this process will result in a judicially created amendment
to the constitution, the doctrine places a heavy responsibility on the
court.
In so far as home rule cities are concerned, the doctrine necessarily
creates doubts about other powers conferred by article XX. 169 To
some extent, therefore, the vitality of that amendment will probably
depend on whether the court limits the doctrine of the Sweet case to
instances of irresolvable conflict or continues to apply it on the basis
of some presumed intent of the electorate.
AN OVERALL

EVALUATION

It has been claimed that: "Of the 50 states, Colorado's Constitution provides one of the broadest and strongest grants of home rule
powers to cities."' 170
This statement, as a description of the express language of article
XX, is undoubtedly true. But what of the judicial gloss the court
has added over the years? Looking at some of the decisions, 171 one
could argue that the court has greatly reduced the breadth and
strength of the home rule amendment. On balance, however, when
all of the court's decisions are considered this argument has little,
if any, validity. In the vast majority of its decisions, the court has
169. Article XXIV of the Colorado constitution (the old age pension amendment), for example, could conceivably be construed to require that 85% of all
revenues derived from municipal retail sales and excise taxes levied on the
"storage, use or consumption of any commodity or product" id. § 2, be allocated
to the pension fund. Such a construction would not, as in the Sweet case, deprive
the home rule city of the power to levy such taxes, but it would deprive the city
of the major portion of the tax revenues. Such a construction of article XXIV
seems very doubtful in view of the court's earlier decisions. Colorado v. City &
County of Denver, 106 Colo. 519, 107 P.2d 317 (1940) (amendment not applicable
to cigarette tax levied by city as an "occupational tax") ; Post v. City of Grand
Junction, 118 Colo. 434, 195 P.2d 958 (1948) (amendment not applicable to occupational tax levied on liquor dealers).
The recent amendment to section 3 of article X authorizing the legislature to
exempt "household furnishings and personal effects" from the general ad valorern
property tax may preclude a home rule city from taxing such property under
section 6 of article XX in the face of legislative exemption. COLO. CONST. art. X,
§ 3 (1956).
Similarly, because of the 1956 amendment of article X, section 6, home rule
cities, with certain exceptions, may also be precluded from imposing taxes, particularly ad valorem property taxes, on motor vehicles. The 1934 amendment adding
section 18 to article X may divest home rule cities of any authority to impose
revenue licensing fees on motor vehicles or excise taxes on motor fuels; or, if
it does not deprive them of such authority, it may obligate them to remit such
revenues to the state for the "construction, maintenance and supervision of the
public highways of [the] state." COLO. CONST. art. X, § 18 (1934).
170.

YEAR

171.

E.g., City & County of Denver v. Tihen, 77 Colo. 212, 235 Pac. 777 (1925).

BOOK OF TIlE STATE OF COLORADO 201

(1961).
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demonstrated an awareness of, and sympathy for, the original objectives and purposes of the amendment. The cases indicating lack of
sympathy or understanding have been few. 1 72 To be sure, particularly since 1950, the reasoning employed by the court in some cases178
cannot easily be reconciled with the amendment nor with many of
the court's prior decisions. But the specific results in these cases
are not necessarily contrary to what one might have expected had
the court maintained a greater consistency with its earlier philo174
sophy.
The cases which have caused the court its greatest difficulties have
been those involving an exercise of the police power by home rule
cities. But even here, home rule cities have been accorded a substantial degree of control. Indeed, more subjects have been classed
1 77
75
or mixed 176 than statewide.
by the court as local'

172. Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 369 P.2d 67 (1962); In re Senate Bill No. 72, 139 Colo.
371, 339 P.2d 501 (1959) ; City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329
P.2d 441 (1958) ; City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958) ;
People v. City & County of Denver, 90 Colo. 598, 10 P.2d 1106 (1932) ; City &
County of Denver v. Tilien, 77 Colo. 212, 235 Pac. 777 (1925); Mauff v. People,
52 Colo. 562, 123 Pac. 101 (1912) ; Keefe v. People, 37 Colo. 317, 87 Pac. 791 (1906).
173. Specifically, Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 369 P.2d 67 (1962) ; City & County of
Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958) ; City of Canon City v. Merris,
137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
174. Particularly the results in Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of County Comm'rs, supra note 173, and City of Canon City v.
Merris, supra note 173.
175. Dominguez v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 233, 363 P.2d 661 (1961)
(vagrancy) ; Lehman v. City & County of Denver, 144 Colo. 109, 355 P.2d 309 (1960)
(unauthorized parking on private property) ; Wiggins v. McAuliffe, 144 Colo. 363,
356 P.2d 487 (1960) (regulation of speeds on city streets) ; Pickett v. City of Boulder,
144 Colo. 387, 389, 356 P.2d 489, 490 (1960) (dictum) (failing to stop for flashing
red school light); Retallack v. Police Court, 142 Colo. 214, 351 P.2d 884 (1960)
(reckless driving); Thiele v. City & County of Denver, 135 Colo. 442, 312 P.2d 786
(1957) ("dog leash" ordinance) ; Heron v. City & County of Denver, 131 Colo.
501, 283 P.2d 647 (1955) (ordinance requiring plans for buildings of a public
nature be prepared and submitted by a state licensed architect) ; Rosenbaum v.
City & County of Denver, 102 Colo. 530, 81 P.2d 760 (1938) (Sunday closing ordinance) ; City & County of Denver v. Henry, 95 Colo. 582, 38 P.2d 895 (1934)
(rights-of-way at street intersections); Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo.
344, 255 Pac. 443 (1927) (zoning) (by implication); Averch v. City & County of
Denver, 78 Colo. 246, 242 Pac. 47 (1925) (zoning); City of Pueblo v. Kurtz, 66
Colo. 447, 182 Pac. 884 (1919) (impounding stray animals).
Numerous cases had held that rates charged by a privately owned public
utility within a home rule city were a matter of local concern. See e.g., City &
County of Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 67 Colo. 225, 184 Pac. 604
(1919), appeal dismissed, 251 U.S. 545 (1920) ; Spears v. Public Util. Comm'n, 100
Colo. 369, 67 P.2d 1029 (1937).
For all practical purposes these cases were overruled in 1952, at least as to privately owned utilities which also provided services
to persons living outside home rule cities. People ex rel. Pub. Util. Comm'n v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952).
Subsequently, with the adoption of article XXV of the constitution, in 1954, home
rule cities were divested of such control over all privately owned utilities.
176. Woolverton v. City & County of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 361 P.2d 982
(1961) (gambling); City & County of Denver v. Pike, 140 Colo. 17, 342 P.2d
688 (1959) (speeds on a federal highway traversing the city) ; Spears Hosp. v. State
Bd. of Health, 122 Colo. 147, 220 P.2d 872 (1950) (licensing of hospitals); Board
of Trustees v. People ex rel. Behrman, 119 Colo. 301, 203 P.2d 490 (1949) (firemen
and policemen pension funds), overruled on other grounds, Police Pension and
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Moreover, the history of the home rule amendment suggests that
in terms of securing greater freedom in making policy judgments about
municipal affairs, other powers were considered as, or more, impor7
tant than the police power.17'
Certainly today with municipalities
providing an ever increasing number of services, other govermental
powers, at least in total, should be of greater concern. The power
to tax (including the power to levy local assessments and impose service charges) , to condemn private and public property, to
borrow money, and to spend money and otherwise acquire and dispose service charges) , to condemn private and public property, to
of a city to provide services to its inhabitants. It is clear from
looking at the cases involving these powers that the court has
given real meaning to the home rule amendment by allowing a wide
range of freedom. t7
When these powers are considered, it cannot
Relief Bd. v. McPhail, 139 Colo. 330, 338 P.2d 694 (1959); Ray v. City & County
of Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942) (by implication) (rates charged by
small loan companies) ; McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P.2d
969 (1940) (regulation of peddlers); Provident Loan Soc'y v. City & County of
Denver, 64 Colo. 400, 172 Pac. 10 (1918) (licensing of pawnbrokers) ; Glendinning
v. City & County of Denver, 50 Colo. 240, 114 Pac. 652 (1911) (by implication)
(licensing of oleomargarine manufacturers)
177. Gazotti v. City & County of Denver, 143 Colo. 311, 352 P.2d 963 (1960)
(larceny); Davis v. City & County of Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 342 P.2d 674 (1959)
(driving while one's license has been suspended); City & County of Denver v.
Palmer, 140 Colo. 27, 342 P.2d 687 (1959) (driving after one's license has been
revoked) ; City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958) (driving
under the influence of intoxicants) ; People ex rel. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952) (see discussion note 175
supra; City &eCounty of Denver v. Bridwell, 122 Colo. 520, 224 P.2d 217 (1950)
(appeals from municipal courts of home rule cities to state courts) ; People v.
Graham, 107 Colo. 202, 110 P.2d 256 (1941) (duties of drivers of motor vehicles
to stop after an accident, give certain information and render aid) ; Armstrong v.
Johnson Storage &eMoving Co., 84 Colo. 142, 268 Pac. 978 (1928) (licensing of motor
vehicles. Case suggests subject might be considered mixed.).
178. See generally KING, THE HISTORY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF DENVER WIT
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ITS RELATIONS WIIH PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS Ch. V
(1911); RUSH, THE CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATED ch. XVIII (1941).
179. Taxing power. The court has upheld the power of home rule cities to
levy other taxes than the ad valorem taxes specifically authorized by COLO. CONST.
art. XX, § 6 (g). City of Englewood v. Wright, 147 Colo. 537, 364 P.2d 569 (1961)
(general occupation tax) ; Post v. City of Grand Junction, 118 Colo. 434, 195 P.2d
958 (1948) (occupation tax on liquor dealers); Hollenbeck v. City 9- County of
Denver, 97 Colo. 370, 49 P.2d 435 (1935) (occupation tax on service stations);
Interstate Business Exch. v. City & County of Denver, 68 Colo. 318, 190 Pac. 508
(1920) (occupation tax on employment agencies) .
Special assessments for local improvements. "[A]ssessments for local improvements would seem to be typically and pre-eminently 'of local concern.' The city's
powers with reference to local assessments are therefore plenary."
Board of
County Comm'rs v. City of Colorado Springs, 66 Colo. 111, 117, 180 Pac. 301, 304
(1919). A home rule city may establish its own procedures for creating improvement districts and levying special assessments. Sanborn v. City of Boulder, 74
Colo. 358, 221 Pac. 1077 (1924) . But it must comply with its own established
procedures. Watson v. City of Fort Collins, 86 Colo. 305, 281 Pac. 355 (1929).
The special assessment theory may be used for the acquisition of park lands.
Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 52 Colo. 15, 119 Pac. 156 (1911). And
assessments may be levied against property owned and used by a county. Board
of County Comns'rs v. City of Colorado Springs, supra.
Service charges for municipal services. A home rule city may impose service
charges for municipal utility services. Western Heights Land Corp. v. City of Fort
Collins, 146 Colo. 464, 362 P.2d 155 (1961) (sewer system) . The General Assembly
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fairly be said that the home rule amendment has failed in its objectives because of judicial antipathy. On the contrary, considering the
may not delegate to the Public Utilities Commission the authority to regulate
such charges, whether the service is being rendered to customers located within or
without the city. City of Englewood v. City & County of Denver, 123 Colo. 290,
229 P.2d 667 (1951).
In the latter case the court relied on CoLo. CONST. art. V,
§ 35, as well as art. XX.
Eminent Domain. An exercise of this power is not limited to the purposes
enumerated in CoLo. CONST. art. XX, § 1. It may be exercised for other local
and municipal purposes. Fishel v. City 8&County of Denver, 106 Colo. 576, 108 P.2d
236 (1940) (condemnation of extraterritorial lands to be donated to federal government). The power may be used to condemn extraterritorial lands, whether privately or publicly owned. Toll v. City & County of Denver, 139 Colo. 462, 340
P.2d 862 (1959) (condemnation of flowage easements and channel improvements
rights in stream flowing across privately owned lands) ; Town of Glendale v.
City & County of Denver, 137 Colo. 188, 322 P.2d 1053 (1958) (home rule city
has power to condemn storm and sanitary easements through public streets of
another municipality, subject to the latter's right to impose reasonable regulations
for the protection of its inhabitants' health and safety) ; City & County of Denver
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 113 Colo. 150, 156 P.2d 101 (1945) (city may condemn county roads for more important public use. Statute limiting the distance
within which cities may condemn extraterritorial lands for airport purposes not
applicable to home rule cities, at least where such statute is not enacted as a
state police power measure, but simply as a limitation on the authority of municipalities.).
Borrowing Power. Any indebtedness must be incurred for a public and
municipal purpose. However, ". . . a legislative declaration to such effect is
given great weight . . . especially when it comes from a [home rule] municipality ..
" Broadhead v. City & County of Denver, 126 Colo. 119, 125, 247 P.2d
140, 143 (1952) (off-street parking facilities); McNichols v. City & County of
Denver, 101 Colo. 316, 74 P.2d 99 (1937) (purchase of lands to be donated to
federal government) . Home rule cities are bound by the constitutional debt
limitations of CoLo. CoNsr. art. XI, § 8, if these provisions are incorporated into
their charters. Deti v. City of Durango, 136 Colo. 272, 316 P.2d 579 (1957).
They
may or may not be bound otherwise. City & County of Denver v. Hallett, 34 Colo.
393, 83 Pac. 1066 (1905) (city held bound by article XI, § 8, at least when not
issuing bonds under the authority conferred by article XX, § 1. Case decided before amendment in 1912 to § 6 of article XX which seems to confer broad borrowing powers.) ; Montgomery v. City & County of Denver, 102 Colo. 427, 80 P.2d
434 (1938) (suggests city not bound); McNichols v. City & County of Denver,
supra (suggests city is bound) ; McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 123 Colo.
132, 230 P.2d 591 (1951) (holds city is bound by maximum total indebtedness
permitted by article XI, § 8. Holding is weakened by fact that this particular
question was not presented to the court in argument. See Petition for Rehearing
on behalf of Defendants-in-Error, p. 3).
A home rule city under CoLo. CoNsT. art. XX, § 6, may by charter authorize
the submission of bond issues at special elections. Clough v. City of Colorado
Springs, 70 Colo. 87, 197 Pac. 896 (1921).
A city may also, by adopting the
provisions of article Xl, § 8, which exempts indebtedness incurred for the purpose of supplying water from the requirement that the question be put to a
vote of the electorate, avoid the same requirement imposed on such indebtedness
by article XX, § 1.
Utilization of municipal property. A home rule city has broad powers to
determine how municipal money and property shall be used. Brodhead v. City
& County of Denver, 126 Colo. 119, 247 P.2d 140 (1952) (off-street parking facilities) ; Garden Home Sanitation Dist. v. City & County of Denver, 116 Colo. 1, 177
P.2d 546 (1947) (sanitary sewer) ; McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 101
Colo. 316, 74 P.2d 99 (1937) (donation of lands to federal government); Cook v.
City of Delta, 100 Colo. 7, 64 P.2d 1257 (1937) (electric light plant); Newton v.
City of Fort Collins, 78 Colo. 380, 241 Pac. 1114 (1925) (waterworks); City &
County of Denver v. Hallett, 34 Colo. 393, 83 Pac. 1066 (1905) (municipal auditorium) . The city must, however, comply with any charter or constitutional
limitations. Kingsley v. City & County of Denver, 126 Colo. 194, 247 P.2d 805
(1952) (charter limitations) ; Lord v. City & County of Denver, 58 Colo. 1, 143 Pac.
284 (1914) (city bound by CoLO. CONST. art. XI, § 1, 2, prohibiting grants-in-aid
to, or joint ownership of property with private persons or other corporations).
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heavy responsibility the court must bear when apportioning the
respective legislative jurisdictions of the state and home rule cities, its
performance over the years cannot be described as less than commendable.
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